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I.
It  is  by  now established  knowledge  that  Japanese  interventionist  policies  versus  Korea
cannot have been motivated by economic profits. Literature in this respect instead points to socio-
political, perhaps military explanations of this instant of Japanese imperialism. Whereas this insight
is certainly more satisfying, it does not pay attention to the role of a series of monetary and financial
reforms both the Japanese government and the Government-General in Korea sought to implement
immediately  after  the  peninsula  had  been  turned  into  a  protectorate.  If  these  reforms  were
insignificant,  why were they pushed through with such vigour, intensity,  and the allocation of so
much resources? Why had financial and monetary matters figured so prominently in the agreement
pertaining  to the creation of the protectorate? And why did the monetary advisers painstakingly
document the progress of reform and corollary surveys of the country's developmental potential?
In this chapter, we will turn to the pre-history of Korea's annexation, and we will reiterate
the importance of considerations of Japan's national security.  We will,  however, also highlight  a
number of inconsistencies at the core of Japanese policies vis-à-vis Korea. These inconsistencies, or
paradoxes,  lead to the demonstration that Japan's  aspirations to achieve  the status of a Western
power in its dealing with its immediate neighbor was ultimately self-defeating. Especially financial
and  economic  considerations,  indeed  the  very alliance  between  politicians  and  people  of  high
finance,  eroded the very strategy of establishing  Korea as its  'line  of interest'. In the immediate
aftermath  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War  (1904-05),  the  tide  seems  to  reverse  to  the  Japanese
advantage.  However,  the enormous burden of foreign loans  and  the consequent  tight  monetary
market  pushes Korea to the forefront of the growing ideology of national mobilization,  and the
desire for economic autarky: an attempt to integrate political and economic objectives.  Although
this  was impossible  to be  realized  on the Japanese  mainland  (in  view of the latter's  social  and
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political  diversity),  Korea's  thoroughly  militarized  government  aggressively  realized  its  agenda.
Korea thus became an experiment with mass mobilization which would charaterize Japan only in
the 1930s. Finance and monetary matters were a major instrument  in facilitating Korea's societal
transformation. We will  demonstrate how the 'Megata reform',  as it  came to be called,  factually
turned Korea into a subsidiary of the Japanese economy. It was a tool aimed to relegate the position
of Korea in the Japanese Lebensraum —to which later generations of politicians would refer as the
Greater East-Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere (dai ta kyeiken ). The Megata reform
was thus not an economic answer to an economic problem in the conventional sense. Instead, it was
developed in reaction to a strategic need.
II.
There exists a certain prehistory to Japanese encroachments on the peninsula. Around 1592-
1598, or a few years before the establishment  of nationwide bakufu rule, then kanpaku1 	
or
'regent' Toyotomi Hideyoshi 

masterminded two invasions of Korea as part of his plan to
conquer Ming China.2 His vision proved shortlived. Both the distance from the theater of combat
and overly ambitious war planning resulted in heavy casualties among Japanese forces. In the end,
military operations on sea and on land were disastrous. Decisively defeated by Korean troops at the
battle of the Noryang Strait (1598), the Japanese withdrew. Their withdrawal marked a shift  from
expansionism that would last for centuries. In 1600, two years after Hideyoshi’s death, Tokugawa
Ieyasu   gained control of Japan and established his  Pax Iaponica; for more than two
hundred  years,  almost  all  diplomatic  and commercial  relations  between Korea and  Japan  were
suspended.3
Japan's kaikoku put Korea once more on Japan's political agenda. First and foremost, Japan's
reformers had decisively chosen to emulate the Western imperialist example very carefully.  Only a
few short years after it  signed the so-called  unequal treaties with the Western powers (1866),  it
1 Kanpaku was the name of the chief advisor to an emperor. It was distinguished from sessh ,
which designated the role of assistant to a child emperor or empress. Together they were referred to
as sekkan 	. In reality, however, there existed little if any difference between these titles, and
several individuals merely changed titles as child emperors grew to adulthood.
2 For a detailed account of events, see: Samuel Hawley, The Imjin War (Berkeley, 2005); Stephen
Turnbull, Samurai Invasion: Japan’s Korean War 1592–98. (London, 2002).
3 Yamagata I., 'Japanese-Korean Relations after the Japanese Invasion of Korean in the XVIth
Century', Transactions of the Korean Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1913.
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tapped into the discourse of the recently developed and Western led framework of 'international
law'4 and sought  to apply its  principles  through the conclusion of a  similar  unequal  treaty with
China. China, in the person of Li Hongzhang 

, forcefully rejected Japanese demands, but the
event  marked a sharp break with the mores of Sinocentrist  Asian  order. Apparently,  Japan was
prepared to dismiss  that constituency,  dissociate from other Asian nations and treat them in the
same way that the Western powers treated them.5 
Geopolitical  dynamics  in  the  second  half  of the nineteenth century reinforced  Japanese
confidence in  engaging Sinocentrism.  Such tensions did not find  their origins in the networks of
intra-Asian relations, however; they were fueled by the incompatibility of these relations with the
vocabulary of Western imperialist  modernity.  Attracted by its seemingly endless resources and its
fabulous potential as a new market, the European powers had turned China into a battleground for
territorial gain, mercantile concessions, mining rights, and investment opportunity. The Opium and
Arrow Wars  (resp.  1840-42  and  1856-58)  had  dealt  severe  blows  to  Chinese  sovereignty  and
prestige. The treaties ending these wars shaped the institutions and imperialist protocols for decades
to come. Especially after 1850, China's vast borderlands seemed like rapidly falling domino stones.
Great-Britain  received  Hongkong  in  1842;  French  advances  into  Saigon,  Cambodia,  and  later
Tongking  triggered  hostilities  with  China  across  China's  border  with  the  latter;  the  eastward
movement of Russia's political authority precipitated a conflict  over the Ili valley in 1871. In the
north, Russia had been closing in  as well.  With China distracted by the challenges of the Arrow
War, Russian negotiators established a claim to  former Chinese territories north of the Amur river
4 For a contemporary critical assessment of Western values, notions of international law and free
trade, see: Kenneth Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power And Purpose  (New
York, 2007), pp.69ff. For a description of the mercantilist view that notion of free trade was no
more than self-serving semantics of the imperialist victors, see Mark Metzler: 'The
Cosmopolitanism of National Economics: Friedrich List in a Japanese Mirror,' pp. ??????-????? in
A. G. Hopkins (ed.), Global History: Interactions between the Universal and the Local (Palgrave-
Macmillan, 2006).  Compare, for an assessment of international law from a Japanese perspective at
the time, the diary of Kido Kin (Kido Takahashi) ﬀﬁ: 'One cannot depend on international
law without having a well-prepared military force. Many countries use the cloak of international
law to seek their own interest in dealing with weaker nations. This is one of the reasons that I call
international law a mere tool for depriving a weak nation of its rights.' Sidney Devere Brown and
Akiko Hirota.(transl.), Diary of Kido Takayoshi 1868-1871 (Tokyo, 1983), p. 148 ('21 December
1868'); also quoted in Masao Miyoshi, As We Saw Them: The First Japanese Embassy to the
United States (1860) (Berkeley, 1979), p. 143.
5 With a clear hint to the anti-Asianist doctrines later spelled out by Fukuzawa Yukichi, see esp.
Ch. ????, pp. ??????)?
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and east of the Assuri  !"

, and secured  navigation rights for both.6 
One obvious consequence of these events was the contraction of Chinese borders. This in
itself was worrying enough. But on a more profound level,  the very fact that China would have to
reckon with the notion of boundaries  at all effectively erased the rationale  of the whole China-
centered  East-Asian  system.  In  order  to  understand  this,  it  is  sufficient  to  consider  these
developments against the background of China's  age-old role of cultural and political attractor in
East-Asia. From the very outset, its foreign relations had been defined not so much on the basis of
territorial boundaries fixed by treaties and legal arrangements —as these came to be enforced on a
global  scale  in  the  nineteenth  century— but  founded  on  the  distinction  between  center  and
periphery,7 defined in the broad terms of cultural unity (in terms of Confucian values, the use of the
Chinese  script...).  The latter was  incarnated in  and regulated by  tributary relationships  with its
immediate and less immediate neighbors. By means of tribute, the latter affirmed their subordinate
status vis-à-vis the Chinese emperor; in exchange, the emperor conferred upon his vassals certain
ranks and titles, and sent them gifts as signs of his benevolence. Better still, he gave them rights to
trade,  which  were  especially  valuable.  In  short,  rulers  of  neighboring  states  received  various
privileges and they even escaped interference in internal affairs ...on the condition of recognizing
the emperor's authority.
Imperialism  demanded the abrupt  abolition of this  irredentist  politico-cultural institution.
The maritime powers denounced Chinese attempts to impose elements of the tributary system upon
their diplomats and merchants with profound indignation. Therefore, the treaties ending the wars
with  China  typically  included  provisions  of  extraterritoriality  (ry#jisaibanken $%&'( ),
guaranteeing  that  Western  subjects  would  be  treated  according  to  their  own countries'  law  as
administered through their countries' consular offices.8 And the same treaties stipulated equality, de
facto the subordination of China to the superimposed structure and institutions of modernity and
imperialism.
6 For references on China's encounter with Western imperialism: Douglas Hurd, The Arrow War:
An Anglo-Chinese Confusion. John Selby, The Paper Dragon: An Account of the China Wars,
1840-1900; J. Y. Wong, Deadly Dreams:  Opium, Imperialism, and the Arrow War (1856-1860) in
China; Henri Cordier, Histoire des  Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales. I.
(1860-1875), II. (1875-1887) (Paris, 1901/02).
7 For a discussion of center-periphery as a principle of societal differentiation, see: Niklas
Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt am Main, 1997), pp. ?????-?????.
8 Charles Denby, ‘Extraterritoriality in China’, The American Journal of International Law, Vol.
18, No. 4. (Oct., 1924), pp. 667-675.
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III.
One  country,  however,  was  remarkably  aloof  from the  voracious  new imperialist  world
order: Korea. The 'Hermit Nation',9 as it came to be called, remained firmly embedded in the pre-
imperialist  Sinocentric  system,  and  continued  to  send  tributary  envoys  even  after  gunboat
diplomacy had drawn China  forcefully  into  signing  unequal treaties.  Interestingly,  it  was not  a
Western  country  but  Japan  that  would  end  this  politico-cultural  isolation  and  'improve  its
conditions',  as one British commentator phrased it at the time.10 Japan did so, as said, as part of a
remarkable  effort  to join the ranks of the 'Western barbarians'  that had subdued them; and such
required the emulation of Western practice,  as there were the vocabulary and institutions of the
nation state,  industrialization,  and,  not  unimportantly,  the acquisition of (semi-)colonies.11 As  a
matter of fact, the early disputes between Japan and Korea concerned the very question whether
Korea  would  chose  to  stay with  the  old  ways,  or  adopt  the  modern  customs  of the  Western
conquerors.  The  fall  of  the  Tokugawa  provided  the  litmus  test.  Japan's  reformers  had  been
consistent  in announcing political changes that had taken place right  after 1868, and employed a
terminology that was void of references to China's role in the new order. Korea, for its part, rejected
the Japanese announcement,  for it  would imply recognizing  the Chinese and Japanese emperors
equal;  and  this,  in  turn,  would  imply  the  marriage  of the  difficult  and  possibly  irreconcilable
positions of being the underdog in two different political systems. 
Japan originally declared the latter's refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the Meiji emperor
as head of state of the Japanese empire  as casus belli (1873). The ensuing debate came known as
the seikanron )*+ (literally: 'punish Korea-debate'), and centered around the question whether
Korea should be penalized for its 'insulting behavior'.12 In many ways, it could be regarded as a case
study for those who perceive the origins of imperialism in domestic conflicts, and efforts to divert
9 After: Rev. Elliott Griffith, Corea, the Hermit Nation (New York, 1882); idem, 'Corea, the Hermit
Nation,' pp. 125-132 in Journal of the American Geographical Society of New York, Vol. 13.
(1881).
10 Edwin Maxey. 'The Reconstruction of Korea.' Political Science Quarterly, 25(4) (1910), pp. 673-
687.
11 For some very thorough Western accounts of Japanese efforts to bring Korea within its sphere of
influence, see: Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-
1910 (Berkeley, 1995); Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 1868-1910; a Study of
Realism and Idealism in International Relations (Philadelphia, 1960).
12 For a good and detailed overview of domestic events during the time of the 1873 Korea crisis,
see: Marlene J. Mayo, ‘The Korean Crisis of 1873 and Early Meiji Foreign Policy’. The Journal of
Asian Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Aug., 1972), pp. 793-819.
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attention from these by means of conquest of foreign territory.13 Indeed, it  is true that this debate
exposed certain  schisms  among the Meiji  modernizers;  and,  in  effect,  it  even estranged several
leading  figures  from the  reform movement.14 Yet,  differences  should  not  be  overstated.  There
probably existed great  of unanimity at the time about  Korea's  eventual position in  the world of
Japanese  making.  Tensions  concerned  the tactical  question  of  when Japan  was  to  intervene  in
Korean affairs  —still  in the process of reforming its own institutions,  a foreign expedition would
have compromised Japan's modernization, as also several Meiji leaders reckoned. In 1873, military
action thus did thus not materialize;15 yet, the debate set the parameters for diplomatic and military
pressure to force Korea to move out of China's sphere of influence into its own. 
As a first  step,  Japan resorted to some sort of gunboat  diplomacy,  in  order to extort the
Korean government and have it conclude the Kanghwa treaty 
,-
./ (1876).16 This Japanese-
Korean Friendship  Treaty ( 0123.4 nicch#-sh5k#j#ki),  as  it  otherwise  came  known,
officially  recognized Korea's independence. Completely in line with the objectives of the unequal
treaties forced upon Japan, however, it was designed to open up two Korean ports other than Pusan
67
for trade (Wonsan 87 and Inchon 9:);17 it furthermore permitted the continuation of
Japanese coastal surveys (which had been the source of hostilities in the first place); and it granted
Japanese subjects the right of extraterritoriality and other rights that had been regarded as a defiance
of 'national dignity'  at home. From the Japanese perspective,  its conclusion must  have marked a
radically new beginning for Japan-Korea relations. It ended the ceremonial exchanges through the
13 See, for instance: Hans-Ulrich Wehler, 'Industrial Growth and Early German Imperialism', in
Roger Owen and R.B. Sutcliffe, Studies in the Theory of Imperialism (London, 1972), pp. 72-90.
14 It caused, most prominently, the 'last samurai' Saig Takamori ;
<=>
to turn away from the
restoration movement and eventually launch a rebellion, which was forcefully repressed. See: Mark
Ravina, The Last Samurai: The Life and Battles of Saigo Takamori (Hoboken, New Jersey, 2004)
15 For a detailed overview of the debate, Hilary Conroy remains an important reference: Hilary
Conroy,  'Chosen Mondai: The Korean Problem in Meiji Japan'. Proceedings of the American
Philosophical Society 100, no. 5 (Oct 15, 1956), pp. 443-454; idem, The Japanese Seizure of
Korea, 1868-1910; a Study of Realism and Idealism in International Relations (Philadelphia 1960);
for a more recent discussion, see: Andre Schmid, 'Colonialism and the Korea Problem in the
Historiography of Modern Japan —A Review Article'. The Journal of Asian Studies 59: 4 (2000),
pp. 951-976.
16 The Japanese military probably stage-managed an incident by sending a gunboat, the Uny# ?
@
,
into Korean waters; Korean batteries at Kangwha island opened fire, but were silenced by the
Unyo's responding cannons. Later, the military sent a fleet led by Special Envoy Kuroda Kiyotaka,
demanding an apology from the Joseon government and an intercommerce treaty between the two
nations.
17 Martina Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys: The Opening of Korea, 1875-
1885 (Seattle & London, 1977).
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S A family on Tsushima  BC and, instead, stipulated intercourses between the two nations on
the  basis  of  the  'law  of  nations'.  Although  the  treaty  did  not  mention  tariffs  or  other  trade
regulations, it clearly was an unequal treaty nevertheless. 
If Japan's intentions would not have been clear from this first agreement, the supplementary
treaty 
.4D
E
and trade regulations F
G
4
H
negotiated throughout the summer of 1876 left no
room for doubt. In many ways, these were worse than what Japan had suffered when it fell victim to
Western gunboat  diplomacy.18 First  of all,  Japanese nationals  were exempted from all  tariffs  on
imports and exports; second, Japan agreed not to impose levies on any products coming from or
going to Korea. And most important for the discussion here, Korean merchants were from now on
to accept Japanese currency in  exchange for their products at face value; or, in  other words, the
exchange of Japanese yen and Korean copper coins was regulated on the basis of pure equality of
type and weight (IJIKLM).19 Without tariffs, however modest, and without even a premium
for converting Japanese currency into Korean currency, Japanese merchants now had a considerable
advantage over their  foreign  counterparts  —a prime  example  of 'free  market  imperialism'.  And
especially after the establishment of a branch of Shibusawa Eiichi's  First National Bank NOPQ
RS
in  Pusan (1878),  it  gave Japan a powerful  instrument  for  gaining  more influence  on the
peninsula. It assisted policy makers among others in the in the establishment of a Korean pro-Japan
faction,  if  only  by  making  clear  beyond  ambiguity  that  Japan  had  some  real  interests  on the
peninsula. The yen had set its first footsteps on the Asian continent; now it was to be seen whether
it could consolidate that position, and be powerful a tool enough to gain Japan political leverage. 
As  an  almost  natural  consequence,  such  intervention  in  Korean  affairs  had  to  trigger
conflicts of interest with Korea's larger neighbor. China set out on a series of efforts to neutralize
Japanese  influence  by  turning  their  tactics  against  themselves.20 Korea  concluded  commercial
treaties with other 'barbarian' nations: with the United States, Britain and Germany in 1882. Later,
similar  rights were extended to Italy,  Russia  and France.  Sino-Japanese rivalry briefly  reached a
zenith in 1884, when a failed coup d'état by the Korean pro-Japan faction brought their armies face-
18 Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, p. 48.
19 The original text of this stipulation goes as follows: 0
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. See, for the original: www.jacar.go.jp, reference code:
B06150027600. 
20 Mary C. Wright, 'The Adaptability of Ch'ing Diplomacy: The Case of Korea,' The Journal of
Asian Studies 17:3 (May 1958), pp. 363-381.
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to-face  of  each  other.  But  again,  fighting  was  warded  off;  in  Tianjin,  Li  Hongzhang  and  It
Hirobumi agreed to withdraw their troops and refrain from seeking further intervention in Korea,
for instance through dispatching military advisors.21 
IV.
Although much could be made of the impact and scale of these contentions, the reader must
be  aware  of the profoundly  pro-imperialist  climate  of the era.  Nobody perceived  any  harm in
meddling  in Korean affairs.  As a matter of fact,  Charles  LeGendre,  an American adviser  to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs had even encouraged the Japanese to move on to Korea, after they had
withdrawn their troops from Taiwan in 1874 a punitive expedition for the slaughtering of fifty-
four  Ryky  Islands  fishermen  by Taiwanese  aboriginals  in  1872.22 Until  the end  of the Sino-
Japanese War of 1894-95,  Japanese actions can even hardly be said to carry the hallmarks  of a
proactive expansionism. For one, this had to do with the awe in which the Japanese (and Chinese)
side held Western military might. Fearing that unrest on the Asian mainland would be used by the
powers as a pretext  for military intervention, both Japanese and Chinese leaders were extremely
careful to contain the 'Korea problem' (chsen mondai  ¡¢£).
But  there were other,  deeper  reasons for  Japan's  actions  which  were characterized  by a
remarkable  mix  self-constraint  and  expansionist  nervousness.  Drawing  on research  about  what
21 This treaty should not be confused with the 1858 Treaty of Tianjin that ended the 1st Opium
War. On Korea's difficult position in between China and Japan and, for that sake, between the
discourses of tradition and modernity, see: Andre Schmid, Korea Between Empires, 1895-1919
(New York, 2002).
22 Wayne C. McWilliams, 'East Meets East. The Soejima Mission to China, 1873'. Monumenta
Nipponica 30:3 (Autumn 1975), pp. 237-275; Edwin Pah-Wah Leung, 'The Quasi-War in East Asia:
Japan's Expedition to Taiwan and the Ryky Controversy'. Modern Asian Studies 17:2 (1983), pp.
257-281. Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea, pp. 37ff.; see as well: Ernst L. Presseisen, 'Roots
of Japanese Imperialism: A Memorandum of Charles LeGendre', The Journal of Modern History
29:2 (June 1957), pp. 108-111; LeGendre's memorandum was given attention by then German
Minister in Tokyo, Theodor von Holleben. On Korea, LeGendre's views are as follows: 'If [Korea]
cannot be annexed to Japan, it should be fortified against outside encroachments by the introduction
of modern political organization and means of defense. In that superior state, while Corea [sic.]
never be able to effect anything against Japan, it would cease to invite foreign intervention or, what
would be worse, annexation, and could serve as a barrier to Japan against attacks from the outside'.
Presseisen, 'Roots of Japanese Imperialism', p. 111. For a Japanese source, see: Yoshino Sakuz ¤
¥¦
§
,  ¨
©ª«¬­
®¯
Legendre nihon gaik no onjin shgun LeGendre (LeGendre,
Benefactor of Japanese Diplomacy), °±²³´µ Meiji bunka kenky¶ (July, August 1972).
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could be called the sociopsychology of imperialism in the late nineteenth century, Peter Duus has
indicated  that  Japanese  attitudes towards Korea were  characterized  by  'strategic  anxiety'.23 The
Meiji  elite  showed  itself  on numerous  occasions  highly  pessimistic  about  the course of world
events, and extremely skeptical about the values of liberty assumedly embodied in free trade and
international law.  Such pessimism did not exist  of gloomy fantasies.  Having  grown up with the
experience of 'black ships' and unequal treaties, reformers were profoundly aware of the tightening
grip of the Western powers on China,  the latter's imminent  break-up  —something that had been
inconceivable until ten years before that—and the threat that posed to Japanese security. They saw
the world  and  time  in  which they lived  as Hobbes's  Leviathan,  and  understandably  viewed  the
discourses of equality and liberty as contingent constructions covering up that grim reality.  Their
reactions were furthermore very similar  to many impulses that underlay European policies at the
time.24 In more than one way, imperialism was a self-propelling force, fed by the prospect of zero-
sum. If country A would enhance its strategic position in a world with ever scarcer possibilities for
expansion, it would do so at the expense of countries B and C. It would thus be in the interest of B
and C for preempting A's action and expand first, with the sole aim of keeping out rivals whose
expansion would pose a threat  to national  security,  even if  such threat was speculative  or even
farfetched.
This  calculus  of  expecting  the  worst  explains,  among  others,  why  the  lines  of
communication of several nineteenth century empires were so thinly stretched. But it  also reveals
that the frontiers of one's empire were as much frontiers of trade and power as 'frontiers of fear'. 25 It
is in this context that one should see Jacob Meckel’s description of Korea as a ‘dagger thrust at the
heart of Japan’.26 In the eyes of many an observer at the time, Korea was the linchpin for Japan's
security;  it  was  the  one  country  that  made  the  difference  between  Japan's  survival  or  peril.
Yamagata  Aritomo  ·¸¹º put  it  eloquently  in  his  famous  memorial  on foreign  policy,
published in the 1890s. Although it has been widely referred to when explaining the motives behind
23 Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910
(Berkeley / Los Angeles / London), pp. 15ff. Duus refers more particularly to an article by John
Gallagher and Ronald Robinson about the frantic partition of Africa. John Gallagher & Ronald
Robertson, 'The Partition of Africa' in J.P.T. Bury (ed.), New Cambridge Modern History 11, pp.
615-617.
24 In this respect, Duus eloquently quotes Henry Kissinger's saying that even paranoiacs have
enemies. Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, p. 16.
25 After John Gallagher & Ronald Robertson, 'The Partition of Africa', p. 615.
26 For a biography of Major Meckel, see: Georg Kerst: Jacob Meckel: sein Leben, sein Wirken in
Deutschland und Japan (Göttingen, 1970); the citation is quoted in Ramon Hawley Myers & Mark
R. Peattie (eds.), The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945 (Princeton, NJ, 1984), p. 15.
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Japan's  expansionist  drive,  it  merits  reproduction in  view  of the  clarity  and  conciseness  of its
argument:
There are two ways to secure national independence and defense.  The first is to protect the line of
sovereignty [»
¼½
]. The second is to protect the line of interest [¾¿
½
]. The line of sovereignty
means the nation's border and the line of interest includes the area closely related to the safety of the
line of sovereignty.  There is no country that does  not try to defend both lines.  Under  the present
circumstance,  to maintain our independence and stand against  the Western powers, defending  the
line of sovereignty is not enough. We need to protect our line of interest as well.27 
Korea, he said, was a country within the cordon of interest, but was experiencing several dangerous
brushes with losing its independence. In the very soon future, the European Powers would be an
even  more powerful  threat  to reckon with,  especially  once the trans-Siberian railway  would  be
completed; a Chinese military and navel build-up, possibly coupled with alliances with the Western
powers would pose enormous challenges to the independence of the Korean peninsula as well.  In
the final analysis, Yamagata leaves no room for doubt: should Korea's fall occur, Japan's cordon of
sovereignty too would come under enormous strain.
I am inclined  to see strong connections between Japan's  aforementioned strategic anxiety
and its stress on Korea's independence. For the larger part, existing scholarship has badly defined
the function and importance of the latter, more often than not viewing it as lip service, a calculated
and instrumentalist matter. Especially Korean historians have stressed the cynicism of the Japanese
government towards the rhetorics of a country's sovereignty, and have accused the Meiji leaders of
indifference versus the needs of the Korean populace and its desire to achieve true independence
and progress.28 The memorandum of LeGendre (cf. Footnote 22 ???), however, tends to give more
credibility  to the intentions of the Meiji  leaders.  So does Peter Duus,  probably following  Hilary
Conroy,  when  pointing  out  that  the  'Japanese  insistence  on reform was  too  persistent,  and  in
execution often too politically inept' to support other interpretations.29 It is far from my intention to
27 The fulltext version can be found in: ?????????. For other documents pertaining to Yamagata,
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Yamagata Aritomo kankei bunsho (documents related to
Yamagata Aritomo) (Tokyo, 2004-06). 
28 For a typical example, see: Lee, Ki-Baik. 1985. A New History of Korea. (Cambridge, MC,
1985); Seung, Kwon Synn. 1981. The Russo-Japanese Rivalry Over Korea, 1876-1904. (Seoul,
1981).
29 Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, p. 71; compare pp. 51 ff. This account includes references to
reports and memoranda written by key decision makers as Inoue Kaoru, Matsukata Masayoshi, and
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applaud  Japan’s  objectives,  and  I  certainly  do  not  assume  idealism  on the  side  of its  leading
individuals, but one cannot seriously deny a genuine concern with Korea’s autonomy. This concern
was, admittedly, not inspired by the ideals of internationalism, but it also did not have to. Indeed,
Japanese imperialism was concerned with Korea's economic penetration, as we shall see in greater
detail. But it  also, to the same degree, addressed the question of strategic rivalry with the Western
powers,  and  in  dealing  with  them 'sovereignty',  'autonomy'  and  'progress'  were  not  devoid  of
meaning.  They  were  the  terminological  framework  by  means  of  which  the  advanced  nations
positioned themselves versus the backward nations, and, what is  more, they carried real strategic
substance:
'what made Korea of  strategic  concern was not merely  its  proximity  to Japan but its  inability to
defend itself against outsiders. If Korea were truly independent, it posed no strategic problem, but if
Korea remained “backward” and “uncivilized”,  it would remain weak,  and if it remained  weak,  it
would be inviting prey for foreign predators.30
Concretely,  Korea's  independence  did  not  refer  simply  to  its  relations  and  dealings  with  other
countries.  In the widest sense,  it  also meant  the  ability to be independent, through the spread of
education,  the  nurturing  of  agriculture  and  commerce,  the  organization  of  military  and  police
organizations, and the establishment of an objective judiciary force —in short, through the adoption
of modernity and the embrace of civilization.31 Hence, from the Japanese perspective, there was no
necessary contradiction between independence and intervention. Instead, in view of its successful
experiment with the Meiji restoration and its consequent political, financial and educational reform,
it seemed particularly equipped to guide Korea towards independence. That would be a multiple
victory. It would ward off foreign criticisms of intervention in Korea's domestic affairs, and rather
gain appreciation for furthering Korean civilization and progress; it  would enable Korea to resist
foreign intrusion; it created a chance for Japan to sign the fate of the China-based constituency and
as such take the lead in imposing the Western order in Asia; and, as a conduit of change, it would
provide Japan with further political and economic influence on the peninsula.
Yamagata Aritomo. Matsukata called for a resolute hands-off approach: 'Since we have already
recognized Korea as an independent country, let's stop interfering in its internal affairs as best as we
can. If we rashly interfere in their internal affairs, this will damage the appearance of Korean
independence'. Tokutomi Ichirë ìí
îï
ð
, ñò
óôõö
÷
Køshaku Matsukata Masayoshi
den Vol. II, pp. 499-500.
30 Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, p. 49.
31 After an editorial in Hùchi Shinbun (June 1894); also quoted in Duus, The Abacus and the
Sword, p. 51.
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V.
Unfortunately for the Meiji-leaders, there was much more at stake than political motives and
means.  From the very outset, commercial interests had involved themselves.  As a matter of fact,
they had been engraved in the treaties and their appendices prepared and negotiated by the very
same  politicians.  Because  the  older  merchant  houses  like  Mitsui,  Ono  and  Shimada  took little
interest in trade with the peninsula, the government decided to take the lead. It did so by turning to a
new generation of successful  Japanese businessmen:  people like  Iwasaki Yatarù  úûüýþ ,
ß
kura Kihachirù  

þ and Shibusawa Eiichi , all in their own right the doyens of
Meiji  entrepreneurialism.  What  distinguished  them was their  involvement  in  promoting  foreign
trade. They were especially favored by politicians as 
ß
kubo Toshimichi   	
 and 
ß
kuma
Shigenobu    ,  who  both  had  vested  working  relationships  with  the  business  world.
Consecutive leaders would continue to endorse the rationale of Korea's economic penetration. In
1894, at the heat of the Sino-Japanese war, Matsukata Masayoshi spoke of 'obtaining real interests
and real rights' (
 jitsuri jikken) there, and thus enhancing the interest of the Japanese
state, without officiously intervening politically. 32 It proposed furthering Japanese presence in other
treaty ports,  obtaining  mining  concessions,  building  a  railroad  between  Seoul  and  Pusan,  and
obtaining the permission to lay telegraph lines.  With or without knowing, he and others had thus
had been creating a policy framework that would hamper, and in  the end undermine,  the widely
shared political objective of Korean independence.33 It is important to realize that this contradiction
was bore out  by the early policy framework  itself.  Assessing  its  preeminence  over respectively
subordination  to  exogenous  factors is  thereby  a  matter  of detail.  Yet,  the  point  is  that,  when
combined with the latter, these inconsistencies innate to Japanese policy triggered a dynamic  that
made an increased intervention in Korean affairs all the more likely.
The cradle of the problem was the aforementioned paragraph seven in the treaty appendix
stipulating 1) that  Korean merchants were to accept Japanese currency in change for their products
at face value and 2) that Japanese nationals were allowed to use and ship Korean copper coins. This
created a situation that was not unlike the currency crisis Japan itself had faced when being forced
into internationalizing. With the exchange rate between yen and Korean copper sen (1 = 660 ;
32 Tokutomi, Køshaku Matsukata Masayoshi den Vol. II, pp. 499.
33 This is an aspect I believe to be neglected in Peter Duus' otherwise excellent study.
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the name of the copper sen at the time was jøhei tshø ) been set at a rate dangerously
close to the bullion price for copper, fluctuations in the supply of copper sen (i.e. when causing the
bullion price for copper to be higher than the face value of the coins) made it attractive for Japanese
merchants  to melt  Korean coins  and  ship  them to Japan as bullion.  Although they might  have
chosen to make a profit  by selling the bullion and turn the acquired money into gold, they were
most likely to use the obtained capital to repeat the process and close the exchange circle.34 At least
theoretically,  this increased demand for the relatively depreciated coins would feed back onto their
price,  which would then eventually  stabilize  at a level that was close to the negotiated exchange
ration (i.e. when the cost of melting the Korean copper sen is offset by its exchange value). In other
words, and again theoretically, this would lead to a situation in which the exchange rate between the
Japanese yen and the Korean sen was was pegged within an interval reflecting the costs associated
with melting Korean sen and shipping them to Japan on the one hand, and maintaining its use as
currency on the other.
As  a most  natural  consequence,  the possibility  of such 'arbitrage'  invited  interests from
Japanese  bankers.  As  early  as  March  1878,  Shibusawa  Eiichi's  First  National  Bank therefore
opened an exchange office —in the parlance of the day: køkansho — in the port of Pusan,
with the self-proclaimed  mission of 'smoothening  and facilitating commerce between Korea and
Japan'.35 Its mandate unambiguously sought to provide all kinds of financial  services to Japanese
nationals  —foreign exchange services,  the acceptance of deposits, secured loans, handling bills  of
exchange,  documentary bills  (ﬀﬁ nigawase),  remittance  bills  ('money  orders';  ﬂﬀﬁ
namigawase), and the like.  Being the only financial  institution in town, it  soon saw its business
flourishing.  The  official  history of the  First  Bank takes pride  in  mentioning  that  the Japanese
consular office in Pusan used it for the disbursement of its funds, and that it acted as the agent for
34 Takashima Masaaki ﬃ
 !
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chøsen ni okeru
shokuminchikinyshi no kenky (a study of colonial financial history: the case of Korea) (Tokyo,
1978), pp. ???ff. In bakufu times, the exchange rate used for trade between the daimyù of Sù and
Korean merchants was much more favorable, i.e. 1  = 500 . 
35 The exchange office came otherwise been known as the First National Bank Pusan Branch
Office 123456789. Originally, Shibusawa had planned the establishment of an
exchange office to be jointly owned with ßkura; the office would operate with paid-in capital of
50,000 yen, half of which provided by Shibusawa, the other half by 
ß
kura; they also sought to
obtain a government loan of 100,000 yen. However, the Japanese ministry of finance at the time did
not allow banks to engage in commercial activities other than banking, and, due to high
expenditures caused by the Seinan rebellion, were not keen on extending a loan. Compare: s.a., 1

45-
daiichi ginkø shi (the history of the First Bank) Vol. 1 (Tokyo, 1957), p. 414-416.
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the Tøkyø Marine Insurance Company.36 Its business records too speak of formidable progress. In
the first half of 1979, only one year after opening its doors, its number of customers had risen to
more than 700; its revenue too had doubled.37 Shibusawa was too shrewd to let the advantages of
this strongly politically supported opportunity slip through his hands, and dreamed of more profit.
When two new treaty ports, Wonsan (1880) and Inchon (1883), were opened, he immediately set up
new offices there. The branch in Inchon was to handle the finances of the consular office there, and
the ones of Seoul's.
In 1882, the establishment of the Bank of Japan brought the era of national banks to a close
and deprived them of the privilege to issue banknotes. The First National Bank had no chance but
to adapt and be rebaptized as a private bank. It had to bring down the number of domestic branches
drastically;  within  Japan,  only  its  abbreviated  name  (First  Bank)  was  reminiscent  of  its  once
illustrious origin. In Korea, however, the situation was very different. Coinciding with the closure
of offices in Japan, it  stepped up its presence on the peninsula  to an unprecedented degree. Paul
Georg von Möllendorf, the German born superintendant of the newly established Korean Maritime
Customes Office,  concluded with Inoue Kaoru the so-called  Tariff Agreement (1883), stipulating
that the First Bank could handle the custom revenues (kaikanzei :;<), a very special privilege;
the tariff rate set at 8 percent and a most-favored nation clause even made it a reasonably favorable
deal for Japanese traders.38 Its activities furthermore continued to receive direct and indirect support
from  the  government  in  Tokyo.  What  is  more,  it  factually  operated  as  a  semi-governmental
institution. Buying  up gold dust (sakin =+ ) in Korea and silver  tael in  Shangai to supply the
newly established  Bank of  Japan with specie  to back its  convertible  notes now became a main
source of profit.39 After  concluding  an agreement  with the  Bank of  Japan in  1886, this  activity
occupied a large part of the First Bank's portfolio. In the period between 1886 and 1889, the total of
gold and silver  bullion remitted to the  Bank of Japan did  amount  to an amount  of no less than
¥2,600,000.40 Japanese economic presence in Korea now seemed to have entered a new stage in its
development.
The impact on the Korean monetary system was immediate and enormous, and deserves our
36 s.a., daiichi ginkø shi, p. 415.
37 Ibidem, p. 416.
38 On von Möllendorf and the Tariff Agreement, see: Yur-Bok Lee, West Goes East: Paul Georg
von Möllendorf and Great Power Imperialism in Late Yi Korea (Honolulu, 1988), esp. pp. 49-59;
correspondence preceding the agreement is reproduced in: s.a., daiichi ginkø shi, p. 527 ff.
39 As we have seen in chapter ???, the Bank of Japan did not print banknotes until 1884; for a short
description of the business of buying bullion, see: s.a., daiichi ginkø shi, pp. 537-538. 
40 s.a., daiichi ginkø shi, p. 538.
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due attention here.  The  dramatically  accelerated,  almost  overnight,  inflow of Japanese  yen  into
Korea effectively shook the economy of a country that had for long insisted on going by its own
traditional ways.  Takashima  Masaaki estimates that it  effectually  relegated Korean copper  sen to
some subsidiary role, whose value was entirely dependent on the actions of exchange offices and
Japanese merchants.41 This effectively drove the value of copper sen to fall even further, adding to
the distress experienced by Korea's currency system (causing ever more copper coins to flow out of
the country). In turn, monetary and financial issues would now end up as an issue on the negotiation
table of Japanese and Korean officials. And more importantly, they would become a crucial factor
in determining Japanese attitudes versus the peninsula.
[ill. 1.; Takashima Masaaki p. 38]
By the way, Shibusawa's ambitions were even bigger. With the prospect of such exchange
bonanza, he envisioned a role for his  First National Bank that may have seemed farfetched at the
time, but that foreshadowed much of Japan's increasing interference in Korean affairs. In a letter to
ß
hashi Hanshichirù  >?@þ (who was to manage the Pusan branch) in 1883, he spoke of the
issuance of bills of exchange that 'may eventually be used as banknotes'.42 Banknotes! Apparently,
he mused with the idea of his bank eventually becoming Korea's national bank. Needless to say, this
aspiration was beyond everything feasible to any Japanese business, even the wealthy and respected
First Bank. But it  nicely underscores how political ambitions and economic interests were, in the
end, incompatible. 
VI. 
Politically,  on the other hand, Japan's position in Korea seemed bleak. The few reforms that
were implemented —'gas lights for the palace, a postal system, the establishment of a national mint
[the so-called ten'enkyoku ABC], and the like'43— did nothing to enhance Korean independence
or national strength. Furthermore, China  had been monitoring Japanese activity on the peninsula
41 Takashima, chDsen ni okeru shokuminchikinyEshi no kenkyE, p. 39.
42 Mentioned in Tatai Yoshio FG
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chDsen ginkD -aru
en-tsEkaken no kDbD (The Bank of Korea -the rise and demise of a yen based currency bloc)
(Tokyo, 2002), p. 31.
43 Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, p. 59 square brackets by M.S..
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closely,  and had therefore sought to have Korea conclude equal trade arrangements with several
Western  countries  (cf.  supra).  It  also  resorted  to  tactics  of  informal  empire  to  reassert  its
predominance  over  her  former  vassal  state.  It  managed,  for  instance,  to  conclude  a  set  of
Regulations  of  Sino-Korean  Maritime  and  Continental  Trade (YZ[\]^_` ,  1882),
according to which Chinese merchants were allowed to settle and trade beyond the treaty ports in
the Korean  Hinterland —a provision that did not exist  for their  Japanese counterparts. There is
considerable evidence that Japanese officials were aware of the fact that they were losing ground;
their  commitment  to  Korean  independence,  once  believed  to  be  a  viable  and  noble  objective,
suddenly appeared hard to take any effect  ever. Their  reactions were,  however,  characterized by
indeterminacy. Of all proposals to issue a loan to the Korean pro-Japan faction, the larger part came
to naught. The loans that did materialize, however, were too small to have an impact on reform, and
were mainly  aimed  at  vesting  the pro-Japan faction.44 Why  all  this  caution?  For  one,  Japanese
businessmen like Shibusawa and Gota Shajira bcdef45 were not eager to invest their capital
in a venture whose outcome was not sure to bring them a safe and profitable return.46 Statesmen on
the other hand believed it unwise to offer massive financial support efforts, especially after a failed
coup d'état (1884) appeared as being orchestrated by Tokyo.47 Most probably, the latter also sealed
the faith of the pro-Japan faction. Around 1884, the Japanese government seemed to realize that its
future in Korea did not lay with the reform movement. And equally importantly: the young Meiji
state was very probably unable to commit itself substantially to lending to Korea.48
But  what  was  the  impact  of  China's  renewed  assertiveness  on  Korea's  monetary  and
financial constituency? Contrary to what one may surmise, the inflow of Mexican dollars (yagin g
M
or kokugin h
M) into Korea was never critical enough to topple the newly established yen-led
monetary constituency.49 Monetary differentiation between port towns and the Korean Hinterland
remained  enormous. Especially  around 1890, Japan even managed  to fortify  its  position largely
44 Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, p. 55ff.
45 About  Gota Shajira, see: ihashi Akio jklm,  bcdefnopqr GotD ShDjirD to
kindai nihon (Gota Shajira and modern Japan) (Tokyo, 1993).
46 The proposals of some businessmen in this respect did not reflect political sensibilities. ikura
Kihachira, for instance, proposed a loan secured against a certain part of the production of Korea's
gold mines (1882). See, in this respect: s.a. nihon gaikD bunsho Vol. 15, pp. 156-157.
47 For a full account in English, see: Harold Francis Cook, Korea's 1884 Incident: Its Background
and Kim Okkyun's Elusive Dream (Seoul, 1972).
48 Supporting this line of argument: Simon James Bytheway, ??????????
49 On the demise of the Mexican dollar as a means of exchange, see: A. Piatt Andrew, 'The End of
the Mexican Dollar'. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 18:3 (May 1904), pp. 321-356.
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through  the  trustworthiness  and  soundness  of  the  First  Bank.  Statistics  on  the  circulation  of
Japanese yen and in Pusan in the period between 1889 and 1891 show leaps of 337 % (Japanese
silver  coins)  respectively  239 % (silver  denominated  Japanese  paper  currency),  amounting  to  ¥
414,265 respectively ¥ 291,735.50 The explanation therefore must largely be sought in the nature of
the silver dollar itself.  Often stamped or chopped by their endorsers beyond all possibility,  these
coins were famous for their low quality. The Japanese silver yen, in contrast, was not only of better
quality; it had also gained credibility as a stable currency. As a matter of fact, its reputation was so
good that Korean merchants in the port cities would often change their copper  sen into Japanese
silver yen, and save them ('Gresham's law'); Chinese merchants often shipped them to China.51 This
in  turn enhanced the importance of paper currency and convertible  notes of the  Bank of Japan
(nichigin dakanken qMstu ). Thus in  this sense,  Japan's monetary takeover of Korea was
already  completed  more  than  a  decade  before  it  established  the  latter  as  a  protectorate.  But
monetary dominion  did  not  necessarily  mean  price  stability.  Seasonal  fluctuations  in  the  trade
volume produced sharp swings in the exchange rate of Korean copper,52 the minting of which did
rarely  respond  to  relative  increases  or  decreases  in  monetary  demand.  Apparently,  Japanese
merchants in Korea tried to restore the stability of Korean currency by issuing sen-convertible bills
of exchange (kansen tegata Zvwx); the First Bank added to the effort by printing tax bills  of
exchange  (zeikan  tegata  yzwx ).  By 1891,  the  Korean  economy thus  found  itself  in  an
impossible  situation.  On the one hand,  it  faced strong political  pressure  from its  large Chinese
neighbor; the latter's merchants furthermore represented the lion's  share of Korea's foreign trade.
But on the other hand, Japanese monetary presence loomed larger than ever. Reform was called for.
It  had  first  presented  itself  through  heavy-handed  Chinese  pressure.  Wary  of  Japan's
ambitions on the peninsula, Li Hong Zhang had been lobbying strongly for the appointment of  von
Möllendorf, with the sole aim of 'spiting the Japanese' (1883).53 Reportedly a dedicated and loyal
individual,54 von  Möllendorf  was  truly committed  to  help  its  employer,  and  to  restore Korea's
50 s.a., 
qr{|
}~
nihon gaikD bunsho (Japanese Diplomatic Records) Vol. 24, p. 176; this
investigation was part of a larger project supervised by Matsukata Masayoshi, aimed at
documenting the circulation of Japanese currency in a variety of Asian countries; as the reader
understands, the investigation's aim was closely connected to the preparation of the adoption of the
gold standard.
51 Takashima, chDsen ni okeru shokuminchikinyEshi no kenkyE, p. 43-44.
52 Statistics can be found in: Takashima, chDsen ni okeru shokuminchikinyEshi no kenkyE, p.51. 
53 After: Frederick Foo Chien, The Opening of Korea: A Study of Chinese Diplomacy, 1876-1885
(Hamden (Conn.), 1967), pp. 42-44.
54 Yur-Bok Lee, West Goes East, p. 45-49.
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monetary  independence  once  and  for  all.  Yet,  whereas  his  aspirations  was  sincere,  the
implementation and effect of his reform were disastrous. Under his direction, the ten'enkyoku would
mint  large  quantities  of low quality  copper  coins.  Apparently,  he had not  given  thought  to the
question of the standard to be adopted by Korea; Korean copper coins being  de facto subsidiary
currency to the Japanese yen,  the mere minting of extra copper coins would not benefit  Korea's
monetary independence, let alone the country's  wealth.55 It was soon obvious that this ill-defined
judgment had opened Pandora's box. Commodity prices soared; throughout the country, rebellious
soldiers from Korea's traditional army units launched a mutiny against Japanese interventionism.
It would take approximately eight  years before the Korean government  would once more
ponder the possibility of monetary reform. In 1891, it promulgated the Regulations with regard to
the Currency of Great Korea (dai chDsenkoku kahei jDrei jKLT). Related to an earlier
plan to solicit  foreign loans in  order to establish a banking system and build  a railroad between
Seoul and Inchon,56 it  approached  two Japanese  businessmen  to assist  the attempt  of monetary
reform. In a letter to members of the Korean pro-international faction, imiwa Chabei (
), the founder of the Fifty-Eighth National Bank, stressed that he and Masuda Nobuyuki (Ł
) of the saka Copper Company ( ) had a great interest  in  'ameliorating and
modernizing' Korean currency, and aspired to strive for the 'orderly organization of your country's
finances'.57 Their  reform effort  too ended  in  failure.  Although  there  was  considerable  financial
backing for the proposal, and although there may have been a chance of succeeding — it sought to
regulate foreign exchange by establishing a silver standard after Japan's example— it was no match
for strong nationalist sentiment within Korea, nor for Chinese maneuvering again any reform effort
that involved Japanese consultants. Soon after several coinage proofs had been minted, the project
was aborted. As a result, the state of Korea's currency system deteriorated even further. The yen-sen
exchange rate of the copper sen dropped every day, until record lows in 1893 and 1894.58 
VII.
55 These criticisms were also voiced in the immediate aftermath of the incident.
56 Takashima, chsen ni okeru shokuminchikinyshi no kenky, p.48-49.
57 Mentioned in: ibidem, p. 49; this invitation of Japanese financiers also attracted attention in the
Tokyo Keizai Zasshi at the time. Compare: Taguchi Ukichi Ł
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chsen no shin kahei chz jigy (the task of minting Korea's new coinage),  Tokyo Keizai Zasshi
670 (April 1893).
58 For statistics, see: s.a., ¤
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¨
©ª nikkan tssh kykai hkoku (report of the
organization for trade between Japan and Korea) Vol. 28 (December 1897).
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The Sino-Japanese War ( ¤«¬­ 1894-1895) marked a sea change in the relationship
between  Tokyo  and  Seoul,  and  was  the  framework  within  which  Japan  sought  to  expand  its
monetary and financial grip.59 Above we have seen that the desire to acquire commercial interests
on  the  peninsula  was  factually  incompatible  with  the  original  plan  of  establishing  Korea's
independence as a means of defending Japan's 'line of interest'. Sooner or later, Japanese statesmen
would have to make different and difficult  strategic choices. As a matter of fact, this happened in
1894, when the insurgence of the so-called Tonghak rebels (a religious sect promising fundamental
social reform) made it clear to policy makers that Korean independence was a non-option, and that
reform would have to be wrought upon from outside. As the chronology of events and the course of
hostilities is  well-documented and outside the scope of this chapter, we will omit them;60 but we
cannot forgo a discussion of monetary and financial experiment accompanying them.
First and foremost, we must be aware of Japan's shift  from 'free trade imperialism'  and a
corollary 'hands-off'  approach to a more interventionist policy,  including 1) thorough institutional
59 W. G. Beasley perceives a change already after 1885: 
'It was during these years that the character of Sino-Japanese rivalry changed, largely because
Japanese modernization was beginning to show commercial results. Japan's imports from Korea, in
which rice and gold were the principle items, were not much at issue, though fears that they might be
cut off because of Korean hostility occasionally caused alarm in Tokyo. More critical was the
question of exports to Korea. Before 1882 some 76 per cent of these had [...] consisted of Western
textiles, bought in Shangai and transshipped in Japan for Korean destinations. As Japan own textile
industry grew, however, re-exported Western goods were replaced by Japanese products, which
amounted to 87 per cent of the total by 1892'.
Beasley however also mentions that this, too, should not be overestimated: 'Most scholars have
concluded that economic interests on this limited scale did not constitute a sufficient reason for
hostilities.' Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, p. 45. This is reinforced by the figures we have: exports
to Korea in 1893 did not exceed 1.7 million yen. Compare in this respect: H® Takush¯ °±
²
(Peng Zizhou), ³´µ¶¤¥«·¸¹º meiji shoki nichi-han shin kankei no kenky (1969),
279-330. As pointed out in the above paragraphs, identifying economic interests as the source and
motor of imperialism is, at least in the Japanese case, missing the point. What mattered over
economic interests was the strategic objective of Japan's national security.
60 There exist several comprehensive accounts: Nathan Chaïkin, The Sino-Japanese War, 1894-
1895: the Noted Basil Chamberlain Collection and a Private Collection (Venthône, 1983);
Trumbull White, The War in the East: Japan, China and Corea (Philadelphia, 1895); Shinobu
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gaikteki kansatsu (the Sino-Japanese War: a political and diplomatic observation) (Tokyo, 1934)
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nisshin sensÎ: nihon no senshi (the Sino-Japanese War: a military history
of Japan). 
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reform and 2) the establishment of economic interests, most directly through railroad concessions.61
For ItÝ Hirobumi, political reform had been a priority above all else. Matsukata Masayoshi was, as
we have seen, the champion when it came to gaining Japan 'real rights and real interests' (cf. supra);
he showed himself rather concerned about all too direct political assistance.62 Inoue Kaoru Þß
à
,
63
 Japan's most experienced man in Korean affairs, maneuvered somewhat in between these visions.
He realized that reform, especially of the financial mismanagement the Korean court, would very
well  fit  in  with  Japanese  interests.  And  he  was  right.  Reform and  Japanese  interests  did  not
necessarily cancel each other out. Let's consider, therefore, issues of  trade and commerce.
By  the  outbreak  of Sino-Japanese  hostilities,  it  had  come  to  the  Korea-based  Japanese
merchants'  attention  that  swings  in  the  yen-sen exchange  rate  ran,  in  the  last  analysis,  against
Japanese  commercial  interests (there had been,  as we have  seen,  several instants of speculation
against  copper  sen,  but  its  profits  had  been too temporary,  and had done nothing  to sustain an
commercial  relationship).  And  responsive  to  several  cries  for  currency  reform  by  Korean
bureaucrats, and to their aspiration to establish a national bank, it now seemed quite reasonable to
aid with the restructuring of the financial system and stabilize commodity prices. Japanese reform
efforts  would  be  directed  at  the  establishment  of sound  national  finance,  buttressed  by  all  the
aspects that would later be central to the Megata reform: a balanced budget with clear accounting of
revenues and expenditures, a reformed tax system, and the uniformization of currency. The means
to those ends included several instrumental and profitable functions for Japanese financiers.  They
could assist  in  furthering  the presence of  Bank of  Japan convertible  notes, and thus relieve  the
longstanding problem of capital shortage; and, most forcefully,  they may bind Korea's monetary
and financial  future to Japan's,  for instance by extending  loans.  Nowhere is  this so frankly  and
boldly expressed as in the following consideration by Inoue Kaoru:
61 There exists several informative studies work on the dynamics of Japanese 'railroad imperialism'
in Korea: Janet Hunter, 'Japanese Government Policy, Business Opinion and the Seoul-Pusan
Railway, 1894-1906'. Modern Asian Studies 11:4 (1977), pp. 573-599; Duus, The Abacus and the
Sword, esp. pp. 103-168. There also exists an official history in Japanese: ChÝsen SÝtokufu á
âã
ä
å
, á
âæç
Ü
ChÎsen tetsudÎshi (a history of railways in Korea) (Seoul, 1915).
62 Tokutomi, KÎshaku Matsukata Masayoshi den Vol. II, pp. 499.
63 Inoue had accompanied Kuroda Kiyotaka to Seoul as vice-plenipotentiary for the negotiation of
the Kangwha treaty (cf. supra); later, when Foreign Minister, he presided over the negotiations of
the treaty of Chemulpo (1882); in 1885 he served as plenipotentiary in the negotiations of the
Treaty of Seoul. For a firsthand description of his career, see: s.n., è
é
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segai Inoue KÎ
den (The Life of the Exalted Duke Inoue), 5 vols.. For his works in Korea, see esp. vol. 3, pp. ???;
vol. 4, p. ????; 
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How was it  that the British had an excuse for  intervening  in Egypt?  Was it  not in the fact that
England had obtained its position of  interest by providing Egypt with capital? […] If we wish to
solidify our position in Korea and to provide a basis for intervention in its internal affairs, it is most
urgent that we strengthen our position in terms of real rights, whether railroads or financial loans,
and prepare the way from financial interventions to other relations.64
Quite a  few opportunities  for  financial  intervention presented themselves  as soon as  the
Sino-Japanese  War  broke out. There was the  First  Bank loan to the Korean pro-reform faction,
amounting to ¥130,000, and at 8 percent. But there also was the failure of the giant ¥5 million loan
in specie.  Its story is  a quite interesting one, as it  again reveals  contradictions in  Japan's policy
making constituency. It had actually been strongly supported by several elderly statesmen, because
its magnitude offered a possibility of a genuine impact on the Korean reform process. As a matter of
fact, the Japanese government had engaged in a careful preparations, with reports describing which
conditions the Korean government had to meet.65 This did not only include the provision that the
loan would be secured against on Korean tax revenues. It also demanded the Korean government to
employ a Japanese financial  adviser who was to 'supervise the whole system of national finance,
and  send  envoys  to  the  provinces  in  order  to  monitor  the  collection  of  taxes'.66 This,  it  was
explained, did 'not diminish the profit of Korea, nor the profit of Japan; instead, it wishes to further
the benefit  and profit  of both'  —an interesting  change in  attitude for  somebody who had  once
envisioned the Egyptianization of the country.67 But then again  —and understandably—  business
was only interested in a safe and profitable return on its investments.68 Insecure of any success of
the country's  reform at  all,  the Mitsui  Bank  was  only  found  willing  to  consider  a  loan at  the
expensive rate of 10 percent. Inoue recalls this event as at odds with Japan's political attitude: 'Just
think  how  inconsistent  it  is  to  charge  such  high  interest  considering  that  this  government  is
practically in our hands'.69 Ultimately, Mitsui suggested to put up the loan, but under conditions that
would have entailed total financial  control over the peninsula.  It  would print  gold backed paper
64 Quoted in Cho ìíî, ïðñòóôÜ kindai kankoku keizaishi [an economic history of
modern Korea] (Tokyo, 1981), pp. 193-194, translation by Peter Duus 1995, pp.134–135; and
importantly, Metzler, Lever of Empire, pp. ?????????; compare as well the letter to Ito Hirobumi
explaining to Inoue Kaoru  the need of a giant ¥1,000,000 loan: Inoue Kaoru Den Vol. 4: pp. 440-
441. For a complete description of Inoue’s activities in Korea, see, Inoue Kaoru Den, pp. 381-539.
65 The full story can be found in: Inoue Kaoru, Inoue Kaoru Den Vol. 4, pp. 451ff.
66 Inoue Kaoru, Inoue Kaoru Den Vol. 4, pp. 452.
67 Inoue Kaoru, Inoue Kaoru Den Vol. 4, pp. 453.
68 Duus has rightfully remarked that 'big capital was less prepared for the “Egyptianization” of
Korea than Inoue was'. Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, p. 94.
69 Nihon GaikÎ Bunsho Vol. 28.1, p. 139.
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currency for circulation, and tie it  to the Japanese yen. If realized, it would have been a very early
example of a gold exchange standard maintained by an East Asian country.
For that, however, time was not yet ripe. Inoue eventually  had to settle with a ¥3 million
loan of the Bank of Japan, only half of which was to be paid in silver coins (the other half was
paper  currency).70 The  BOJ's  agenda  was  unambiguously  different  from Shibusawa's  and  other
entrepreneurs':  as  a  semi-governmental  institution  with  the  explicit  mandate  of  strengthening
Japan's commerce, it  was prepared to finance Korea's financial penetration. Yet, in the end, even
this modified loan plan did not realize.71 Japanese domestic politics had grown bitter about what it
perceived as a soft and inept approach of Korea. According to Duus, 'ebullient  patriotism' in the
wake of the victory over China dominated the debate; Diet members called for a proactive hawkish
approach, and pondered an official protest against the Triple Intervention.72 It were hard times for
the proponents of the conciliatory and cooperative  loan plan.  In such circumstances,  the newly
formed ItÝ cabinet regarded a ¥3,000,000 'contribution' to political reform inopportune.
Whether  or  not  this  decision  was  justified  is  a  matter  of  speculation,  but  the  BOJ's
perception of opportunity was, by the way, not at odds with the realities of the Korean market. Not
only had the Japanese yen gained in importance as trade currency, the Regulations With Regard to
the Issuing of New Money (õö÷øùúûü ), which the Korean government promulgated in
August 1894, also declared the yen as legal tender. This situation was unprecedented. Transaction
costs between the Japanese mainland and the Korean peninsula were now officially  declared  nil.
Consider furthermore the economic aspects of the battlefield. Japanese military forces were already
paying for provisions by means of paper money, and thus created a temporary yen bloc in a country
that was already replete with Japanese money.73 Although it is impossible to estimate the amount of
70 This came out as the result of painstaking rounds of negotiating. Inoue had first proposed to use 5
or 6 million yen from the Chinese indemnity to make a contribution to Korea; 3 million yen would
be used for the repayment of Korean debt to Japan, 1 or 1.5 million would be a gift to the Korean
court; an equivalent amount would be invested in profitable enterprises such as railways, telegraphs,
and so on. His second proposal was basically a way of appeasing the Koreans for resentment caused
by earlier loan negotiations. Inoue Kaoru, Inoue Kaoru Den Vol. 4, esp. pp.???????? ; Duus, The
Abacus and the Sword, p.106. 
71 The event is well documented in Inoue's official biography: Inoue Kaoru, Inoue Kaoru Den Vol.
4, esp. pp. 484ff.
72 Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, p. 107.
73 Compare: Moriyama Shigenori ýþ
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( K)go kaikaku ni okeru shakkan mondai:
Inoue Kaoru no kanyo shita dainiji kaikaku to ch)sen shid)shas) tai) wo ch*shin to shite (the loan
problem in the K)go reforms —with a special focus on Inoue Kaoru's involvement in the second
reform and the reactions of Korea's leaders). +,-. T)y) gakuh) 56:2-4, (March 1975), esp.
pp. 119-126. As a matter of fact, the First Bank had already in 1891 taken up a scheme of issuing
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military spending during this first China campaign, the T)ky) keizai zasshi at the time argued that it
increased  the circulation of yen in  Korea to somewhere in  between ¥1,300,000 and ¥1,500,000
(from the pre-war ¥1,000,000).74 Admittedly,  the benefits  hereof were spread unevenly:  whereas
Japanese merchants were now able to make great profits, the Korean commercial class saw itself
confronted with ever more complicated exchange procedures (Japanese paper yen > Japanese silver
yen > Korean copper  sen) and consequent  losses.  It  was another  source of strong anti-Japanese
sentiment, and certainly contributed to the rejection of reform efforts. But the promoters of Japanese
economic presence in Korea must have seen their dream come true.
VIII.
Maybe we should correct the above sentence, and insist that they saw their dream come true
for a while. As an unintended consequence of Japan's overwhelming economic leverage, its political
position was weaker than ever. Although it had won the war, the European powers won the peace. It
is historically well documented that the Triple Intervention (sangoku kansh) /012) by Russia,
Germany and France on April 23 1895 (less than a week after the signing of the peace treaty with
China)  forced  Japan  to  return  the  Liaodong  peninsula  and  caused  enormous  damage  to  its
international prestige.75 Japanese leaders were aware that, from now on, they had to proceed with
caution —after all,  the Western powers now had discovered their 'real rights and real interests' in
East-Asia too.76 Although they framed their objections in the vocabulary of international law, they
'kansen substitute securities' (kansen daiy) sh)ken 345678), which were in a way some kind
of military scrip (gunpy) 9:), as their objective (presumably) was to prevent Japanese currency to
be further drawn into markets on the Asian mainland; as a reserve for this currency, it planned to
use Japanese silver yen, bank notes, and Japanese subsidiary coinage. The plan was never approved
of by Japanese government authorities. Takashima, ch)sen ni okeru shokuminchi kiny*shi no
kenky*, p.56-57. Duus adds that, due to an unwillingness of the Korean populace in the Hinterland
to accept 'foreign' currency, the Japanese army had to exchange their coins massively into Korean
copper sen, thus creating a temporary inflation in the value of these coins. Duus, The Abacus and
the Sword, p. 160.
74 s.a., ;
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nikkan b)eki-ron hoi (appendix to the theory of Japan-Korea trade),
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T)ky) keizai zasshi 769 (March 1895), pp. 428.
75 See, for some thorough accounts: Morinosuke Kajima, The Diplomacy of Japan 1894-1922 Vol.
1: Sino-Japanese War and Triple Intervention (Tokyo, 1976); Frank W. Iklé, 'The Triple
Intervention. Japan's Lesson in the Diplomacy of Imperialism'. Monumenta Nipponica 22: 1-2
(1967), pp. 122-130. Takashima considers it an instant of Western rejection of Japanese
sovereignty. Takashima, ch)sen ni okeru shokuminchi kiny*shi no kenky*, p. 62.
76 Apparently, Mutsu Munemitsu G
H
IJ
, plenipotentiary negotiator of the treaty, warned Inoue
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were themselves  involved  in  a scramble  for concessions  in  the Far East, and sought  to shortcut
Japanese  attempts  at  monopolizing  its  position  on the peninsula.77 This  attitude  was  especially
strong in Russia, which found itself contained at the Western border of its empire, and thus tried to
project its influence in its less powerful southern and eastern neighbors.78 It signaled a new phase in
Korea's protracted monetary and socio-economic history.
Ironically,  the shift was triggered not so much by external factors as by a change of course
in Japan's policy-making versus Korea. The assassination of queen Min K in October 1895, partly
caused by the clumsy diplomacy of Miura GorL MNOP , who succeeded Inoue as Minister to
Korea, only 'cultivated enmity, not friendship'.79 Although he was immediately replaced by Komura
JutarL QRSTU , a young and ambitious bureaucrat with a great deal of foreign experience,80
Tokyo found it  increasingly  difficult  to find  allies  among Korean leaders,  let  alone  to establish
credibility  vis-à-vis  Western diplomats.  The vision  of losing  not only Korea's  independence  but
eventually Japanese sovereignty loomed larger than ever.
Anti-Japanese  sentiment  was  especially  strong  in  the  early  days  of  Russo-Korean
rapprochement.81 This  is  not  to say that  many  members  of the  Korean  elite  preferred  Russian
influence  over  Japanese  influence.  However,  Russian  foreign  Minister  Lobanov-Rostovsky and
especially  Sergey Witte, the architect of much of Russia's East Asia policy,  made use of the anti-
Japanese momentum to quickly expand its grip  on the political class and to haste the process of
acquiring concessions.82 He had become rather unsatisfied by similar efforts of obtaining interests in
in the wake of the negotiations to use 'extreme caution' in his negotiations with the Koreans. See:
Kim ChVng MyVng WXY, Z
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_
`a (1962-1967) Vol. 4, p. 365.
77 On the scramble for concessions in Korea, see, convincingly: Duus, The Abacus and the Sword,
p.143-168.
78 For a general overview of events, see: Seung Kwon Synn. The Russo-Japanese Rivalry Over
Korea, 1876-1904 (Seoul, 1981), esp. pp. 153ff.
79 Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, pp.108ff.
80 On Komura, see: Nakayama, Takeo bc
de
. QRSTU
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1940); Okamoto, Shumpei. 1979. 'A Phase of Meiji Japan's Attitude toward China: The Case of
Komura Jutaro'. Modern Asian Studies 13:3 (1979), pp. 431-457; Okazaki, Hisahiko stuv. Q
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, 1998).
81 Background information can be found in: David S. Crist, 'Russia's Far Eastern Policy in the
Making'. The Journal of Modern History 14:3 (September 1942), pp. 317-341; Andrew
Malozamoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy 1881-1904. With Special Emphasis on the Causes of the
Russo-Japanese War (Berkeley, 1958).
82 An extensive account of events can be found in: Seung Kwon Synn. The Russo-Japanese Rivalry
Over Korea, 1876-1904 (Seoul, 1981), esp. pp. 224ff.; see as well, briefly: Conroy. The Japanese
Seizure of Korea, 1868-1910, pp. 326-327; David S. Crist, 'Russia's Far Eastern Policy in the
Making', The Journal of Modern History 14:3 (September 1942), pp. 317-341.
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China  through the  Russo-Chinese Bank83 (a  heavily  subsidized  bank  operating with French and
Belgian  money)  and  railroad  concessions  there;  Korea  was  a  less  contested  target  for  his
expansionist  plans.  At the outset, the new Korean government  was eager to help.  Not only did it
dismiss all Japanese advisers who had been appointed to the ministries in 1895; it also gave in to
Russian  pressure  to appoint,  among  others,  Dmitri  Dimitrievich  Pokotilov  (head  of the Russo-
Chinese  Bank)  as  a  financial  adviser.84 Not  much  later,  in  1897,  he  was  replaced  by  Kiril  A.
Alexeev, an official of the Russian customs service, in turn placed under McLeavy Brown, who had
refused to leave his post as customs director.85 Russia also came up with the idea of a Russo-Korean
Bank, which was to take over the deposit of custom duties from the First Bank (as a matter of fact,
this never happened; when the bank opened its doors in 1898, Russian interest in Korea had largely
faded away).86 In the meanwhile,  the Korean government  moved  to eradicate other symbols  of
Japanese  influence  in  the center  of Korean society.  Most  forcefully,  it  resorted to a  scheme of
issuing large amounts of nickel currency (hakudka ) of low denomination, partly in an
attempt to drive Japanese currency out of the market. Nickel coins had been introduced by dint of
the Regulations With Regard to the Issuing of New Money, and occupied their place in between the
standard money (5 silver  ry ) and the still circulating copper sen (alternatively called ysen 
Ł );  its  exchange  rate versus  the  latter  was  defined  as  1:25.  We will  discuss  the detrimental
consequences of this ill-inspired measure for Korea's monetary constituency in later paragraphs.
For now, one must  note that this  move was at  least  in  part endorsed by a sharp shift  in
Japan's  own monetary geography:  the decision  to adopt  the gold standard (cf.  chapter ?????).
Before that, conditions for the  yen on the peninsula had actually been promising. Several reports
mention that, with the exception of Pusan, the port cities treated it as a most stable currency. 87 As
could be expected that quite a bit of silver  coins would return to Japan for redemption, financial
policy makers were to pay extraordinary attention to the circulation of silver-yen convertible paper
money, and the challenges they could pose. For one, the fall of the silver price to be expected as a
natural consequence of Japan's decision would make it  harder to further acquire gold bullion for
83 On the Russo-Chinese Bank, see: Rosemary Quested, The Russo-Chinese Bank. A Multi-
National Fnancial Base of Tsarism in China (Birmingham, 1977).
84 Consequent Russian interventions in Korea's monetary and political affairs is extensively
documented in: Seung, The Russo-Japanese Rivalry Over Korea, pp. 234ff. 
85 The story is told in: Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, p.123; for more details of opinions and
personalities involved, see: Seung, The Russo-Japanese Rivalry Over Korea, pp. 250-253.
86 Seung, The Russo-Japanese Rivalry Over Korea, pp.259-260.
87 

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(report on the legal framework of the currency law and its
implementation), in  (  ¡¢) Vol. 17, pp. 159-161.
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buttressing Japan's currency reserve  —as we know, Germany had faced a similar  dilemma in the
early 1870s. For Japanese policy makers at least, it  would be quite profitable to have silver coins
circulate  in  Korea in  one  form or  another.  But  then again,  problems  for  the Korean economy
remained. Commodity price instability thus brought Korea's monetary reform on the agenda once
more. 
How did Japanese policy makers proceed? In the years before 1897, Ministry of Finance
officials  and Shibusawa Eiichi  seem to have  been in  contact  on a regular  basis,  discussing  the
implications  of  the  adoption  of  the  gold  standard.  Their  schemes  were  in  many  ways
complementary.  Whereas  the  Ministry  of  Finance  (esp.  Sakatani  Yoshio  £¤¥¦ )88 was
concerned with accumulating Korean gold and silver bullion,  Shibusawa's ambitions lie  with the
future of his bank. He expressed, among others, the desire to gradually promote the First Bank 'to
the central bank  of Korea,  plan the unification of its  currency,  and put  its  monetary system in
order'.89 But how could this be done? The Japanese proposal was a prime example of concession
imperialism. Whereas former policy makers had once preached a hands-off approach, they went by
a stauncher  approach now. The idea  was revolutionary.  Sakatani Yoshio  (then head of the Tax
bureau at the Ministry of Finance)  and Shibusawa90 envisioned a Japan-independent  (yet  Japan-
sponsored) system.   Silver  coins  would remain in  circulation but would be hallmarked with the
characters  for  'Japan'  (§¨©ª ).  Foreshadowing  the  First  Bank's  later  role,  Shibusawa
furthermore suggested the issuance  of 'bearer securities'  («¬­®¯° ±²³ ) strictly  for
circulation in Korea —a realization not unlike Shibusawa's musing almost 20 years ago (cf. supra).
In all of its aspects, it reflected characteristics of a full-fledged colonial reform effort.
It was one thing to have a plan; but it  was another to have it  realized. With regard to the
chopped silver coins,  McLeavy Brown left no doubt that they would continue to be accepted; the
exchange rate between chopped and not-chopped silver coins would, in the period of transition be
maintained at 1:1, in order not to destabilize the exchange markets. He furthermore agreed to invest
for ¥300,000 worth of chopped silver coins, and simultaneously attempt to stop the outflow of old
silver-yen to Japan. Not only would this drastically reduce costs for reminting, it again endorsed the
88 On Sakatani, see: Ko Sakatani shishaku kinen jigy´kai µ¶·¸¹º»¼½¾, ¶·¿ÀÁ
sakatani yoshio den (Tokyo, 1951).
89 See:  ÂÃ
ÄÅ
Á
ºÆ
Ç
Vol. 16, pp. 61-70.
90 For Shibusawa's original proposal, see: È
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importance  of  the  old  Japanese  yen  as  trade  currency  on  the  peninsula.  Chopped  coins  were
prohibited  from circulation  (doubtlessly  under  Russian  pressure)  in  February 1898,  only  to  be
reallowed in July that year, after the successful conclusion of the Nishi-Rosen agreement (â ãäå
æçèé).91
IX.
But  what  happened  with Shibusawa's  plan  to  issue  bearer  securities?  In  1897,  Japanese
authorities had refused to discuss Shibusawa's scheme on the grounds that it  was impractical,  and
that it  would offend Korean (and Russian authorities). It turned out, however, to be a prolifically
discussed topic very soon thereafter. As a matter of fact, Japanese authorities had not invested much
efforts in putting up any new loan to the Korean government after Inoue's failed loan plan of 1895.
But around 1898, they were solicited by the Koreans to do so, with the express aim of arranging
Korea's  ever  chaotic  currency system.  Korea's  lack of bullion  made any autonomous attempt  at
reform impossible. Again, Japanese interests had turned against themselves: massive acquisitions of
gold dust and silver bullion by the First Bank had effectively undermined a crucial pillar  of any
monetary  sanitation.92 Yet,  change  was  pressing,  even  for  the  Japanese.  The  instability  of
transaction costs had, as said, always been a major concern for Japanese merchants. The prospect of
the yen altogether disappearing  from the peninsula  as a result  of the decision to adopt the gold
standard looked even bleaker. Yet, Tokyo chose not to address the issue, given its tight budgetary
situation in the aftermath of the war. This changed when it became aware of  a joint American and
British proposal to lend the Korean government  ¥5 million,  mortgaged against  mining  rights on
91 See: Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryê Vol. 16, pp. 70-84; the Nishi-Rosen agreement, which Rosen
himself once called 'a rather lame and pointless convention', marks the so-called 'exchange Korea
for Manchuria'-policy (ëìíî mankan kêkan), whereby Russia and Japan came to agreement
about their strategic interests in their respective spheres. The consequent occupation of Port Arthur
by Russia was, henceforth, not perceived as a threat, but rather as a sign of Russian willingness to
abandon furthering her interests on the peninsula. Seung, The Russo-Japanese Rivalry Over Korea,
pp.264-269.
92 This point is made as well in: Takashima, chêsen ni okeru shokuminchikinyïshi no kenkyï,
p.72ff. For an overview of Japanese bullion acquisitions in the colonies, see: Murakami Katsuhiko
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royal  land.  Its  purpose  allegedly  was  to  permit  the  Korean  government  to  issue  a  new  silver
currency. Hayashi Gonsuke   , then minister to Korea, reacted furiously.  Not only had the
Koreans approached him in 1898 with a similar  loan proposal; he also perceived  the threat and
political importance of such massive amount. From then on, he would relentlessly open and re-open
negotiations with the aim of establishing firmer control over the government and the court. In all
instants, however, it turned out that Japan's own precarious budgetary situation did not permit a firm
commitment to Korea's currency stabilization. Nor was there sufficient political will: especially It
Hirobumi showed himself increasingly sensitive about provoking the Russians.93
This  situation  was  slightly  different  for  Shibusawa's  First  Bank.  Not  a  governmental
institution, it would gladly undertake efforts at Korean monetary reform if such seemed profitable.
This turned out to be the case. In 1900, Shibusawa therefore relentlessly pushed for negotiations
with Brown; his proposals ranged from a loan in the form of a ¥1 million overdraft to a loan of ¥2
million  (in  return for  which  the  First  Bank was granted the right  to issue  custom notes).94 For
Brown, this was unsatisfactory. With a host of questions still  unsolved, negotiations were broken
off  early.  But  a  new  opportunity  presented  itself  as  soon as  1901.  The  indefatigable  Hayashi
suggested that the First Bank issue banknotes, and that it  lend them to the Korean government in
case the latter would be in need of capital.  This proved the right idea.  Although the Ministry of
Finance first objected on the grounds that note issuing was reserved for officially established banks,
it later approved on the grounds that 1) First Bank notes would only circulate under approval of the
Korean government, and 2) that they would circulate in Korea, and hence not contradict the legal
provision that  prohibited privately  issued  money on Japanese  soil.95 This  would,  moreover,  not
acquire approval of the Korean government.96 First Bank notes went into circulation in 1902. In
order not to compete with other currencies,  notably BOJ convertible  notes,  their  denominations
were deliberately low. This also changed their character: less fit  for international transactions, they
were apparently designed for trade with and among the Korean populace; this made them also an
93 Duus again provides a fine account of negotiations. Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, pp.157-
168; his discussion mainly relies on: Moriyama Shigenori 
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94 See as well:  Takashima, chsen ni okeru shokuminchikinyshi no kenky, pp. 62ff.; these
negotiations occur amidst a series of negotiations with several other countries about the very topic
of currency reform. They are listed in: ibid., pp. 65-68.
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ideal vehicle for expanding the use of Japanese currency beyond the port cities. It was an exercise in
colonial financial policy.  As BOJ convertible notes were counted as an integral part of the  First
Bank's  reserve,  it  effectively  made Korea's currency system dependent  on Japan's;97 such was in
clear contrast with the Taiwanese case. But, as Duus has rightly observed, it did not do anything to
lift the pressure of the Korean currency system; instead, it 'added one more layer of complexity'.98 
Even then the currency wars were not  over.  After  early  futile  efforts to  adopt  the gold
standard  after  the  Japanese  example,99 the  Korean  government  undertook  another  attempt  at
currency autonomy in 1903, this time coupled with the idea of establishing  a national bank. The
proposal, dubbed the 1903 Currency Ordinance (otherwise: UVWSXYZ[, after the 5th year
of Gwangmu  rule)  was  clearly  inspired  by  profound  anti-Japanese  sentiment.  Drawing  on the
example of Japan's adoption of the gold standard in 1897, it stipulated that the right to issue coins
lay solely with the Korean government; it prohibited the circulation of Japanese currency; stocks of
the bank were to be held solely by Korean citizens.  Aided by an imported German coin press, it
ordered the ten'enkyoku to mint a half-won silver coin with the effigy of an eagle (\]^_`a
X), and subsidiary coinage with a similar effigy. It turned out to be another desperate reform effort;
coinage appears to have been halted at a fairly early stage. Seen in hindsight, Korean officials did
not grasp the cynical parameters within which reform was to be planned and implemented. Deplete
of bullion and capital,  reforms aimed at establishing  an autonomous currency system had exactly
the perverse effect of aggravating dependence on foreign countries. After all,  they would have to
agree to extend a loan making  any reform possible  at  all  —or in  other  words,  such nationalist
policies ran against the objective of autonomy by their very nature.100
As it turned out, by 1904, at the dawn of the Russo-Japanese war, the monetary geography
of the peninsula  was  more  shattered and  complicated  than ever  before.  As  the  Report  on the
97 This is also indicated by: Metzler, Lever of Empire, pp. 52-55.
98 Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, p. 167.
99 It had, among others, approached Masuda Nobuyuki bc
de
of the fsaka Copper Company
gh
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to participate in a project of minting an entirely new silver currency (1998). One
year later, it proposed the adoption of existing silver coins as the new monetary standard, abolish
the minting of subsidiary coinage, and print paper money instead. Immediately thereafter, it again
turned to minting subsidiary nickel coinage and forbid the circulation of silver yen-coins. The
hastily, almost franticly, drawn proposals are illustrative of the impossible position of Korean
policy makers; all proposals came to naught because of the country's poor bullion holdings.
Takashima, chJsen ni okeru shokuminchikinyKshi no kenkyK, p. 74.
100 This is also noted by: Takashima, chJsen ni okeru shokuminchikinyKshi no kenkyK, p. 77. It
appears that the Korean government entered negotiations with Masuda and Yasuda Zenjirm for a
loan to save the currency reform; these were broken off too, since Yasuda did not perceive
sufficient profit in the operation.
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Rearrangement of Korean Currency makes clear,  the country was differentiated in several currency
regions, with competing monies of different kinds and even different functions.101 
[figure 2: map illustrating the circulation of copper and nickel coins -n=XY
o
Epqr
, p. 14-
15]
Japanese currency, however partly sent back to Japan for redemption, remained particularly strong
in the port cities, where it mainly filled the role of a strong and stable 'trade dollar'. Korean copper
sen, once the main medium of exchange had stopped being minted after 1893, but remained in use
in the more remote regions of the peninsula,  especially in the southern provinces (the area around
Pusan). Later, their importance would only decline, ironically due to the rising copper price. After
1902, a large amount of copper coins was melted down; the nominal amount of copper sen fell to 5
or 6  million  won (from the previous level  of 10 million  won).102 Segregation between currency
regions was more or less complete. People in the copper  sen sphere would not accept the newly
minted nickel currency or hakudJka, which was prominent in Seoul and the central regions of the
country, and which kept proliferating. Around 1905, it occupied more than 50 percent of all coinage
circulating in Korea. As the profit of coinage was large, the government appeared to have no great
interest in not checking its quantities; furthermore, private coinage (st) and counterfeiting (ut)
thrived,  and even included coins  minted in  Japan:  it  was said that around 600 different  kind of
hakudJka circulated at the same time. For a host of reasons,103 but especially because of their being
overcoined, hakudJka tended to be subject to a soaring inflation. Figures speak for themselves. The
Report on the Rearrangement of Korean Currency estimates that, in 1905, the amount of hakudJka
in circulation had reached ¥11,5 million.104 It was a truly 'schizophrenic' currency; nominal value
and real value (purchasing power) were sometimes far apart. Attempts to stabilize its exchange rate
vis-à-vis copper sen by buying this currency of low denomination was only successful to a limited
101 Daiichi ginkJ vwax, n
=XY
o
Epqr
kankoku kahei seiri hJkokusho, p. 14-15; the
point about the non-unified nature of pre-national currencies is convincingly developed by: Eric
Helleiner, The Making of National Money: Territorial Currencies in Historical Perspective (Ithaca
& London, 2002), esp. pp. 19-41.
102 Takashima, chJsen ni okeru shokuminchikinyKshi no kenkyK, p. 91.
103 Takashima also mentions the appreciation of Japanese currency due to increased foreign trade as
a reason for  hakudJka inflation. Takashima, chJsen ni okeru shokuminchikinyKshi no kenkyK, p.
95ff. According to Helleiner, this complicated relationship between monies of large and low
denomination is a quite typical characteristic of pre-national currency systems. Helleiner, The
Making of National Money, pp. 66ff.
104 Report on the Rearrangement of Korean Currency, pp. 13-19.
30.
degree, and most probably explain the frantic ups and downs in the exchange rate of both currencies
vis-à-vis the  Japanese  yen.105 Japanese  policy  makers  were  profoundly  aware  that  one  day
fundamental reform would be inevitable;  they did not know that such opportunity would present
itself sudden and early, and again in the aftermath of a military conflict.
X.
In  all  of  its  aspects,  the  Russo-Japanese  war  of  1904-05  was  an  extremely  costly
undertaking. As argued by Metzler, it confirmed Japan's peculiar financial status in the Darwinian
world  order  of the  early  twentieth  century.106 Although on the gold  standard  and  thus able  to
negotiate  its  war  loans  on  more  or  less  favorable  terms,  the  country  could  barely  carry  the
tremendous  expense  of  ¥1,9  billion  —almost  six  times  the  government's  national  spending  in
1903!107 Forty percent thereof had to be paid through foreign borrowing. From the humanitarian
viewpoint too, its legacy was disastrous. Extensive media coverage, including the new technologies
of the telegraph and photography108 brought  home the image  of the war as a cruel 'World War
Zero'.109 And last  but not least, there was the humiliating aftermath. Although Japan had won the
war, Russia won the peace. Russia's plenipotentiary representative to the Portsmouth talks, Count
Sergei Witte,  very shrewdly  managed to silence  the Japanese  demand  for an indemnity  of  ¥1,2
billion  (= $ 600 million)  by playing  to subconscious American sentiment.  Convinced that racial
prejudice in the Western dominated world order had played an overarching role in the finalization
105 A table of fluctuations in the exchange rate of both copper sen and hakudJka vis-à-vis the
Japanese yen is provided in: Takashima, chJsen ni okeru shokuminchikinyKshi no kenkyK, p. 94;
Takashima draws for this information on an early First Bank report: y
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, p. 20-28.
106 Mark Metzler, Lever of Empire: The International Gold Standard and the Crisis of Liberalism
in Prewar Japan (Berkeley, 2006), p. 45ff.
107 Ono Giichi. 1922. War and Armament Expenditures of Japan (New York, 1922), p. 88. (also
mentioned in Mark Metzler, Lever of Empire: The International Gold Standard and the Crisis of
Liberalism in Prewar Japan (Berkeley, 2006), p. 45. An analysis of war costs can also be found in:
Bank of Japan, Ł

 
Hundred-Year Statistics of the Japanese Economy (Tokyo,
1966), pp. ???????-??????.
108 Compare: s.n., The Russo-Japanese War; a Photographic and Descriptive Review of the Great
Conflict in the Far East, Gathered from the Reports, Records, Cable Despatches, Photographs,
Etc., Etc., of Collier's War Correspondents (New York, 1905); Peter Slattery. Reporting The Russo-
Japanese War, 1904-5: Lionel James's First Wireless Transmissions To The Times (Kent, 2004).
109 After: John W. Steinberg et al. (eds.). The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World
War Zero. 2 vols (Leiden, 2005-2007).
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of  the  settlement,  Japanese  representatives  left  the  negotiators'  table  utterly  frustrated.  On
September 5, 1905, crowds of enraged commoners rioted in the streets of Tokyo. It proved to no
avail. In the end, Russia did not pay indemnity; Japan had to pay for the whole war effort itself, plus
interest. If the war had not yet been cruel enough, the international political arena was. Japanese
leaders learnt the bitter lesson that it had not been enough to win the war; being of Caucasian origin
had been evenly if not more important. 
What was even worse in hindsight, the financial predicament would continue to dominate
Japanese politics and choices for decades to come. In 1904, Takahashi Korekiyo had hailed the war
loans as 'divine providence'.110 They saved, he reckoned, not only Japan's gold standard; but they
would also be the key to unlock the door that stood between Japan and the Asian mainland. Now,
former policies seemed in jeopardy. Two of the enormous 1905 loans with a combined value of £60
million, were to mature in 1925; only 6 years later, in 1931, the immediate £25 million loan was to
mature.  Inability  to lay these loans off at that time would lead Japan straight  into a new era of
borrowing, this time in New York, which had emerged as the world's new financial hub. Then, a
wholly new generation of policy makers would have to deal with a radically different geopolitical
climate  —a climate in  which American financiers,  European economists and Japanese liberalists
alike chose to remember the first  gold standard era quite nostalgically  as an era of international
collaboration, a symbol of a seamless world under the sway of the values of civilization and free
market capitalism. 
XI.
This image would have appeared rather cynical to Japan's leaders in the beginning  of the
century. Painfully aware of its lesser status in the international arena, they had to settle with a minor
reward.  After  all,  there  were  other  spoils  of  war.  First  of  all,  Japan  inherited  rights  and/or
concessions  Russia  had  secretly  acquired  after  Japan  had  been  forced  to  return  the  Liadong
peninsula to China in 1895. But there also was Korea. Now turned into a protectorate, it was soon to
take the guidance of a host of Japanese government-appointed advisers. It was also to become the
opportunity for Japan's prime experiment with a full-fledged gold-exchange standard.
Megata Tanetar's 


 disembarking onto the peninsula marked the reiteration of
a  mantra  that  dominated  Japanese  attitudes  versus  Korea  since  the  early  days  of  the  Meiji
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(Tokyo, 1936), pp. 205-206; also quoted in Metzler, Lever of Empire, p. 47
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reformation. His official biography literally repeats the early claim that Korea and Japan were 'as
close  as  lips  and teeth'  (¥¦ ),111 and  goes on to  argue  that  Japanese  intervention  in  Korea's
domestic affairs was inevitable in view of the latter's ill-willed political class (a viewpoint that was
also strongly present in Inoue's own perception of Korea's problems). Megata's credentials were, by
the way, unblemished. Being the first Japanese national to graduate from Harvard University,  he
had been a successful bureaucrat in the Ministry of Finance, and especially  his work of reforming
the Japanese tax system when he was head of the Ministry's Tax Bureau made him ideally qualified
for the job. In order to guarantee a similar  success in Korea, his prerogatives were defined very
broadly. Megata’s contract, which one finds reproduced in its entirety in his biography,112 gave him
1) the right  to approve all  cabinet  decisions  on finance,  2) the right  to attend cabinet  meetings
concering  finance-related  matters,  and  3)  the  right  to  make  recommendations  to  the  Korean
government through the minister of finance (§¨©ª«) . This exceptional position makes the
practices of Japanese advisers in Korea worthy a study in their own right. But more important to our
discussion,  the  scientific  style  of  his  policies,  particularly  the  interest  in  the  statistical
documentation of their implementation produced a wealth of information on Japanese dealing with
the protectorate; unfortunately the five-volume Report on the Reform of Korea’s National Finance
(¬­®¯°±²³) and the corollary Report on the Arrangement of Korean Currency (¬­´µ
°±²³¶) have received scarce, if any, attention, even among Japanese scholars.113 They are,
nevertheless, an excellent example of Japanese 'scientific' colonialism as pioneered by Got· Shinpei
¸¹º»
in Taiwan and probably only surpassed by its German arch-example.114 These and other
reports115 include  land  surveys,  reports  on  the  state  of  commercial  banking,  foreign  trade,
111 Yoshimura Michio ¼
½¾¿ (ed.), ¿ÀÁÂÃÄÅÆ ÇÈ danshaku megata tanetarÉ – jÉ
(The Biography of Baron Megata TanetarÊ) Vol. 1 (Tokyo, 1938) [I have used the 2002 facsimile
version], p. 343. For references to the lips and teeth metaphor, see as well: Duus, The Abacus and
the Sword, p. 35; p. 50; .
112 Yoshimura,  danshaku megata tanetarÉ, pp. 346-347.
113 Their full reference: Kankoku seifu zaisei komonbu ËÌÍÎÏÍÐÑÒ,  ËÌÏÍÓÔÕÖ
kankoku zaisei seiri hÉkoku (Osaka, 1905-07); Daiichi GinkÉ,  ËÌ×ØÓÔÕÖÙ kankoku
kahei seiri hÉkokusho (Yonsan, 1909)
114 For discussions of German scientific colonialism, compare: Derek Jonathan Penslar, 'Zionism,
Colonialism and Technocracy: Otto Warburg and the Commission for the Exploration of Palestine',
Journal of Contemporary History 25 (1990), pp. 143-160; Jake W. Spidle Jr, 'Colonial Studies in
Imperial Germany', History of Education Quarterly 13:3, pp. 231-247. On the role of statistics in
German political economy after 1900, see, authoritatively: Adam Tooze, Statistics and the German
State, 1900-1945: The Making of Modern Economic Knowledge (Cambridge, 2001).
115 Compare, for instance: H.I.J.M. (His Imperial Japanese Majesty's) Residency General, Annual
Report for 1907 on Reforms and Progress in Korea (Seoul, 1908); idem, The Second Annual
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infrastructure, the cultivation of tobacco, standards of measure, so-called Japanese mauvais subjets
and so on. Japanese bureaucratic control was total and grew more intense over the years: in order to
provide an idea of the degree of control, Atul Kohli indicates that, in 1937, there were nearly fifteen
Japanese officials in Korea for every French administrator in Vietnam (thereby noting that French
control of Vietnam was considerably more intense than, say, British presence in Nigeria). 116 Japan
adopted some sort of developmental colonialism, with a large centralist administration and an army
of bureaucrats, economic mechanisms as administrative guidance for strategic and infant industries,
carefully administered investment programs, and, above all, policies preceded by extensive research
of Korea’s  society and  its  institutions.  This  streamlined,  professional-managerial  approach may
have been as much a necessity as an example of a consciously selected paradigm. Thomas C. Smith
once  remarked  about  Japan’s  own  industrialization  that  the  Japanese  state  had  to  ‘act  as
entrepreneur, financier,  and manager’. The reason therefore lies exactly in  what we have seen as
Japan’s  status  of  a  late  developer,  and  the  consequent  problem  of  lack  of  capital  generating
capacity: ‘capital was too weak, too timid, and too inexperienced to undertake development’.117 For
obvious reasons,  we cannot  discuss  the nature nor the complete contents of the aforementioned
reports and related activity in detail;  we will,  instead, look into their attention for monetary and
financial matters.
As  the  Korean  monetary  system  was  in  such  extraordinary  disarray,  its  restructuring
('modernization')  was Megata's  first  and foremost  task.  It  must  however  be stressed at  the very
outset that Megata's ambitions lay with a total takeover of control over all monetary and financial
matters; in that sense, it is no more than a conscious prelude to the annexation of Korea in 1910.118
Backed by several decisions by the genrÉ ÚÛ or 'senior statesmen' on the course of actions Japan
should take versus Korea, Megata's task was to consider the the options of monetary dependence
respectively  monetary unification,  no  less  no  more —options  that  both clearly  parted with the
earlier 'hands-off' politics.119 Whereas direct political influence had previously not been an objective
but for a limited number of expansionist hawks, successes in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese
Report on Reforms and Progress in Korea (1908-1909) (Seoul, 1909). Similar reports were
published until the outbreak of the second war with China (1939).
116 Atul Kohli, State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global
Periphery (Cambridge, 2004), p. 35.
117 Thomas C. Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan: Government
Enterprise, 1868-1880 (Stanford, 1955), p. 102.
118 This is also stressed by:  Takashima, chÉsen ni okeru shokuminchikinyÜshi no kenkyÜ, p. 115ff.
119 One finds references to both possibilities in: s.a., Ý
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a common currency system for Japan and Korea).
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wars had clearly set a different climate.
One of the most central and immediate concerns was the elimination of several institutions
associated with the (mis)management of national finance in Yi Korea. There were several reasons
for this.  Megata —correctly!— noted the fundamental distortions of checks and balances  in  the
Korean political  constituency.  Although it  is  probably  an exaggeration to view the latter  as no
different from power structures in Heian Japan, as one observer suggests,120 imbalances were prone
to result  in  the enrichment  of only  a very small  segment  of Korean society,  and a progressive
impoverishment  of society as a whole. This is especially  obvious if  considering the extraordinary
position of the Korean court. Characterized by an ever growing appetite for spending in disregard of
the nation's needs and capabilities, it drained the country from valuable resources to a degree that
was beyond  doubt disastrous.  Megata reckons that at the time  of his  arrival  in  Korea,  the total
revenue of the government was around 15,000,000 won, of which 1,400,000 won was allocated to
the imperial court. But this was not all: the court added to this the revenues of its monopoly on the
ginseng trade (2,000,000 won), the profits of seigniorage (so-called îØïð; amount unknown),
the income through the granting of rights to open certain businesses and rights extended to foreign
merchants (amount unknown), the income of toll rights (620,000  won), mining (40,000 won) and
forestation (amount  unknown), the gold dust trade (600,000  won), and a variety of special  taxes
(amount unknown).121 If aggregated benefits for the court amounted to at least 5,600,000 won  per
year, or equivalent to more than one third of the government revenue! To make matters worse, the
court sometimes issued 'emergency orders' to the Ministry of Finance for various expenses. For an
obvious reason, a very first policy was to separate the finances of the government and the court.122
Almost simultaneously, Megata abolished the Korean Mint (ñòó, cf. supra), which he —again
justifiably— identified as a major factor in the currency turmoil, and set up an independent Printing
120 Hagiwara Hikozô õö÷ø,  ùú
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kankoku zaisei no seiri kaikaku -zaisei komon Megata Tanetar no gyseki (Tokyo, 1966) , p. 6.
121 Kankoku seifu zaisei komonbu, kankoku zaisei seiri hkoku vol. I,  chapter 4: 1-14 (the report
does not contain page numbers in the conventional sense); the yen/won exchange rate at the time
was set at roughly 1/2.
122 For an explanation of how Megata proceeded, see:  Yoshimura Michio 
 (ed.), 
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danshaku megata tanetar – j (The Biography of Baron Megata Tanetar) Vol.
1 (Tokyo, 1938) [I have used the 2002 facsimile version], pp. 359
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Office (labeled ); later, he established a treasury ()123, a budget office124 (ﬀﬁﬂﬃ)
and an elaborate tax agency ( !").125 At the same time, the Japanese government promulgated
'Ordinance 73', by dint of which the First Bank was given the function of Korea's central bank (only
in name short of being the National Bank of Korea).126 Mainly Japan's own problems with specie
shortage made it a schoolbook example of a colonial financial system. The First Bank notes were
not backed by gold,  but by Japanese  yen (which was, as we have seen, in turn backed by British
sterling through the London holdings of the Yokohama Specie Bank): BOJ notes and securities, the
latter partly the new debts the Korean government owed the First Bank.
XII.
Other  decisions  did  however  much  more  than  sanitizing  Korean  currency  and  its
institutional environment.  Especially  the euphemistic  'currency reform' brought about a thorough
transformation  of  the  peninsula's  immediate  and  long-term  political  economic  destiny.  The
objectives seem fair enough: withdrawing the inflationary nickel coins and older copper coins from
circulation, and install a nationwide and uniform legal tender.127 This was to be carried out as the
123 The treasury would be managed by the Korean National Bank, but as the latter had not yet been
established, management of the treasury was the task of the First Bank. See furthermore:
Yoshimura Michio, danshaku megata tanetar – j, pp. 353ff.; 370ff.;  Kankoku seifu zaisei
komonbu, kankoku zaisei seiri hkoku vol. I,  chapter 2.
124 Yoshimura Michio,  danshaku megata tanetar – j, pp. 408-412.
125 Yoshimura Michio,  danshaku megata tanetar – j, pp. 438ff.
126 Compare in this respect: #$
%&
'()
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Vol. 16, p. 183-214; this ordinance stipulated,
among others, that the First Bank was provided with an extra ¥5,000,000 (at 3 per cent interest),
and that its number of branches was further expanded. Importantly, the contract with the First Bank
also allowed the principally unlimited circulation (mugai ts+y ,-./) of First Bank notes.
Idem, p. 215-216. The first governor of this central bank was Ichihara Morihiro 0
123
, who had
formerly been employed at the bank's Yokohama branch. See: Chsen ginkshi kenky4kai 5
67
89
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Chsen ginkshi (Tokyo, 1987), p. 25-30. This is not to say that
Japanese policy makers were united in their choice for the First Bank. As a matter of fact, several
proposals circulated, of which the proposal to establish Sino-Japanese Bank was the most
prominent; differences concerned the degree and nature of currency unification. Compare:
Takashima, chsen ni okeru shokuminchi kiny+shi no kenky+, p.119-125.
127 Jung-en Woo contests this objective, claiming that the nickel and copper coins 'had been
exceptionally stable, as large scale inflation was impossible with those metals'. As demonstrated
above, this is not true. It also misses the point in that, after Korea's opening, both nickel and copper
coins were never an alternative to Japanese currency: they could  not be used in international trade,
and were themselves confined to certain regions on the peninsula. See: Jung-en Woo, Race to the
Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization (New York, 1991), p. 26
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main result of an earlier decision, taken on January 8, to implement a gold standard (in practice a
gold  exchange  standard)  —itself  an  offspring  of  the  longstanding  ambition  to  harmonize  the
Japanese and Korean currency systems. But at least in terms of procedure, its implementation left
much to be questioned. First, there was the matter of the reform's institutional setting. The Korean
Mint being obsolete, the choice for an institutional partner could have hardly been less surprising:
currency reform would be carried in tandem with the branches of Shibusawa's First Bank128 —Jung-
en Woo refers to them as  agents provocateurs.129 In order to enable the government to pay for the
bank's  services  and  cost  of the  reform,  it  lent  directly  to  the  government  ¥3,000,000 (secured
against  the  custom receipts)  at  an  interest  rate  of  six  per  cent;  the  Korean  government  then
immediately remitted it.130 
An analysis of the process of redemption reveals furthermore the degree to which Megata's
policies turned reform into a more than profitable affair  for Japanese businesses in Korea. Let us
first look at the redemption of the nickel coins. The process was drastic and spectacular: between
July 1905 and November 1909, 381,051,954 pieces had been returned, amounting to no less than
¥9,355,230.895. Yet this mere observation obscures several of the problems and problem solutions
that accompanied the exchange process. First of all,  the Ordinance With Regard to the Exchange
stipulated that only good quality coins would be qualified for exchange; the rate, set at 2,5 sen (2<
5 = ) resp. 1  sen (for low quality coins) of the new yen,  was also rather adverse to nickel coin
holders.  But  one should  not lose sight  of the fact  that  exchange of coins  was only one way of
redeeming the nickel currency. Seen over the years, it  occupies only 47% of of the total process,
and appears to have been substantial only in the process's earliest phase. From 1906, its share drops
sharply,  making place for other categories as 'paid into the treasury' (>?@) and, especially,
'bought up' (A?). About the currency paid into the treasury, we can be brief. It basically concerns
nickel currency received through taxes of all sorts. But what explains the extraordinary share (37%)
of exchange through buying up currency?
[insert:  Takashima,  chsen ni  okeru shokuminchi  kiny+shi  no kenky+,  p. 127; this is  the gist  of
findings in Daiichi Gink,  B>
CD
EFGHI
kankoku kahei seiri hkokusho, pp. 51-110]
128 One finds the contracts pertaining to the reform reproduced in: Daiichi Gink,  B>
CD
EFG
HI
kankoku kahei seiri hkokusho, pp. 37-42.
129 Jung-en Woo, Race to the Swift, p. 25.
130 This was not the first instant of aggressive colonial finance: in June 1905, the First Bank had
issued ¥2,000,000 in treasury bonds in Tokyo; in spite of the tight financial situation in the war's
aftermath, these were spectacularly overscribed by five times.
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This sharp shift  must  be discussed as the outcome of a depression, triggered by the prospect of
reform itself —that was especially  true for uncertainties about which of the so many circulating
kinds would be considered sound.131 The first phase of redemption had brought about an exchange
rate stabilized around J 200 (old nickel coins) = K100 (new coins), but consequent speculation by
Japanese  and  Chinese  merchants,  who  sought  to  make  profits  out  of  the  exchange  process
exacerbated  the  depression  of  Korea's  economic  constituency,  eventually  leading  to  a  protest
movement  directed  against  Megata.132 The  resulting  difficulty  of  having  the  old  nickel  coins
exchanged at all and the gloomy vision of parallel currencies was the main motivation for Megata
and the First Bank to resort to the rather radical policy buying up currency (the First bank report
refers to it  as  tokushu no hLhL MNOPQ ).  They would  therefore turn to middlemen,  i.e.
'trustworthy merchants' and 'banks and financial institutions', to whom the exchange rate of 2.5 sen
would be upheld.133 For both, receiving nickel currency through transactions with ordinary Koreans,
this was a golden opportunity. Although there were some provisions about the possibility of halting
exchange  in  the  case  of exceptionally  low quality  coins,  the  merchants  must  have  made  great
profits. As we see in the above table, [...]. This scheme also fitted other interests of the government
in Tokyo: indirectly, after all, it assisted in boosting the use of First Bank banknotes, because they
were given in exchange of nickel coins thus collected.
By November  30 1909,  when  the circulation of  hakudLka was officially  prohibited,  the
process of redemption was more or less complete.134 The Korean and Japanese currency systems
were now de facto integrated. Yet, reform had come at a great cost. Faced by enormous losses,
thousands went bankrupt or had to turn to massive lending with the newly established 'grassroots'
financial institutions like the tegata kumiai RSTU, kyLdL sLko VWXY,  regional financial
cooperatives ZP[\TU, and the provincial agricultural and industrial banks ]^
_`
.
135
 The
131 The First Bank report refers to extensive surveys into the regional varieties of nickel currency
and their relative purity and quality. See: Daiichi GinkL, kankoku kahei seiri hLkokusho, pp. 66-68.
132 Idem, p. 70. It is important to realize that protest was not confined to the Korean populace, but
included quite a few influential Japanese merchants as well. Particularly the role of Nishihara
Kameza b
cde
, who is the main actor of the following chapter deserves attention. As Japanese
immigrant to Korea, he had developed a wide network of pro-Japanese Korean acquaintances. In
the position of adviser (sLdanyaku fgh) to the Seoul Chamber of Commerce he lobbied against
Megata from the viewpoint of Korean independence, and was an ardent antagonist of Japanese
efforts to expropriate land to extend railways or build military bases.
133 Idem, p. 89.
134 Daiichi GinkL, kankoku kahei seiri hLkokusho, p. 110.
135 In order to be able to implement this policy, the banks were lent money at no interest.
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reader understands that the cost was thus mainly born by small Korean merchants and the populace.
And evenly important,  hakudLka redemption had also  translated in a large-scale net transfer of
Korean monetary assets to the Japanese merchant and banking classes.136
XIII.
The exchange of the copper coins or yLsen is a very different story. With them, the problem
was not so much inflation, but the continuously rising price of copper bullion after 1900. As we
have seen earlier, this had already resulted in a dramatic fall in the amount of this currency of low
denomination.  Furthermore,  Megata  and  his  his  personnel  at  the  National  Finance  Advisory
Division (ijklm ) did not  envisage  their  complete redemption,  but  rather  the controlled
limitation of their circulation. They would thus be employed as one kind of subsidiary coinage in
the newly established gold exchange standard system.137 Export of the yLsen remained an important
mechanism in their redemption: at the end of 1907, almost 419,000,000 pieces had been exported,
equivalent to an amount of ¥1,617,981 or 25% of the total of coins taken out of circulation.138 In
comparison with the hakudLka, buying up currency played a far lesser role, partly because of the
credibility  this currency held in  the regions it  circulated; instead, large amounts where collected
through taxes.  Even then, however, speculation posed its problems. When prefectural tax offices
(no) perceived opportunities in the exchange rate of the copper coins, they would often exchange
the  collected  ypsen  into  new  currency  before  remitting  them  into  the  treasury.  Much  to  the
frustration of Megata,  ypsen were thus once more brought into circulation.
It  is  in  this  context  therefore  that  Megata chose  to  erect  a  centralized  tax agency,  and
furthered  Japanese  grip  on  the  peninsula's  fiscal  system  by  means  of  supervisory  offices
(zeimukanbu qrst), directly responsible  to the Ministry of Finance.139 But Megata must be
credited for the positive side-effects of its implementation. Centralization was not only prerequisite
to a sound system of taxation; it also functioned as a mobilizing force, including as a facilitator for
136 Compare as well: Takashima, chpsen ni okeru shokuminchi kinyushi no kenkyu, p.130-132.
137 Daiichi Ginkp, kankoku kahei seiri hpkokusho, p. 114.
138 See: Daiichi Ginkp,  kankoku kahei seiri hpkokusho, p. 111-146; a digest of these figures can be
found as well in: Takashima, chpsen ni okeru shokuminchi kinyushi no kenkyu, p. 134.
139 See, in this respect: Kankoku seifu zaisei komonbu, kankoku zaisei seiri hpkoku  Nr. 4 (vwx),
pp. 39ff.
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the creation of credit.140 In the wake of tax reform, regional councils (yz{|}) and regional
financial cooperatives (yz~) discovered their raison d'être. Created in order to 'aid the
intentions of bureaucrats with regard to finance, further understanding about related regulations, and
report  to  the  government  questions  and  uncertainties'141 respectively  'expand  lending  by  the
Agricultural and Industrial Banks and aid in the establishment of agricultural storage'142, they also
most certainly assisted in redemption of coinage after 1909. It appears, after all, that by 1910, only
40% of old currencies had been redeemed.143 Although the Japanese economic takeover was to be
considered complete, it was hard to change the habits of people in the Hinterland...
XIV.
Monetary  reorganization  and  tax  reform were  however  only  the  beginning  of  Korea's
modernization. In the immediate aftermath of this 'most urgent of urgencies' (rr ),144
Korea was invaded by a panoply of financial institutions, each devoted to a different sector of the
banking business,  and some of them surprisingly advanced for the state of the Korean economy.
This is somewhat surreal. Up to 1900 this country had had only a very rudimentary economy and
financial system. Indeed, there had been pawnbrokers, moneylenders for whom their financial work
was only a side line associated with other commercial activities,145 and the kye (; mutual financial
institutions).146 But typical of the underdeveloped state of this 'system' was their informal nature, the
140 Yoshimura Michio,  danshaku megata tanetarp – jp, pp.430ff.; on the relationship between the
tax reform and regional financial cooperatives, see Kankoku seifu zaisei komonbu, kankoku zaisei
seiri hpkoku  Nr. 4 (vwx), pp.301ff.
141 Kankoku seifu zaisei komonbu , kankoku zaisei seiri hpkoku  Nr. 4 (vwx), p. 59: yz{|}


v

.
142 Kankoku seifu zaisei komonbu, kankoku zaisei seiri hpkoku  Nr. 4 (vwx), p. 328.
143 This is an estimate by: Kurumada Atsushi Ł

, 

 chpsen kypdp kumiai ron
(A theory of Korea's cooperative unions) (Tokyo, 1990 (1932), p. 16-17; idem, p. 242-263.
Takashima follows this analysis; Takashima, chpsen ni okeru shokuminchi kinyushi no kenkyu, p.
138.
144 Yoshimura Michio,  danshaku megata tanetarp – jp, p. 431.
145 This is reminiscent of Japan's system of sake brewer-moneylenders who dominated the market
in the Muromachi period. See: Susan Gay, The Money Lenders of Late Medieval Kyoto (Honolulu,
2001). 
146 See, for more information: Colin D. Campbell & Chung Shick Ahn, 'Kyes and Mujins —
Financial Intermediaries in South Korea', Economic Development and Cultural Change 11:1
(October 1962), pp. 55-68.
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insignificance of their size and transactions, and their operating locally.147 
Almost  overnight,  the  Megata  reform  parted  with  the  decentralized,  even  fragmented
structure of Korea's economy and society, and installed a modern financial system characterized by
sound  correspondance ().148 From Megata' and others remaining reports and
articles  published  at  the  time,149 we  understand  that  he  envisaged  a  financial  system  firmly
supervised by 3 quintessentially  Japanese institutions: the  First Bank, the  Japan Industrial Bank,
and the Oriental Development Company. At the central of the financial system was of course the
Seoul branch office of the  First Bank,  which,  as soon as currency reform was implemented was
turned into the Bank of Korea (, 1909; in 1911, it would be renamed Bank of Chosen 
).150 It was a lender of last resort to a host of both Japanese and Korean led saving banks, which
in turn catered to regional and/or small-scale credit institutions.151 The money lenders, for instance,
continued to operate largely locally,  but depended on bank credit as an important source for their
operations.
However, its mission was defined broader than just the ones of a central bank. Apart from
discounting bills of exchange, it would also serve as a development bank, typically extending long-
term credit secured against real estate ( ). And curiously enough, its very early mission
description also included the role of a so-called 'overseas bank' (¡¢, after the German term
of  Überseebank). Although this appears as odd in view of Japan and certainly Korea's problems
with capital shortage, it  was actually directed at the balance-of-payments problem of Korea under
colonial  administration.  Continuous  trade deficits  with the Japanese  mainland  drove  it  into  the
business of foreign exchange with countries with which it had a trade surplus. South-Manchuria in
particular proved an attractive partner, especially  after the Japanese victory over Russia.  Colonial
147 This translated, as is so often the case in premodern economies, in exorbitant interest rates, to be
explained by the monopolistic character of financial institutions, the limited availability of funds
due to low rates of savings, and the fact that lending was done for consumption rather than for
investment in expanding productivity.
148 For an overview, see: Takashima, chpsen ni okeru shokuminchi kinyushi no kenkyu, p.139ff.;
157ff.
149 See especially the records of Mizumachi Kesaroku £¤
¥¦§ (records are referred to as £¤
¥¦§¨©ª« (microfilmed)) in the Modern Japanese Political History Materials reading room
of the National Diet Library. It appears there were certain disagreements between Mizumachi and
Sh¬da Kazue ­o
®
when it came to the question of establishing an independent Korean central
bank, or employing a branch office of the Bank of Japan.
150 This is all well documented: Ch¬sen gink¬shi kenky¯kai, Ch°sen gink°shi, pp. 38-88.
151 See, for an overview: Sung Jae Koh ±
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shokuminchi kinyÀ
seisaku no shiteki bunseki (a historical analysis of financial policies in the colony) (Tokyo, 1972).
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dominion  over  Korea  thus  also  provided,  indeed  almost  necessitated,  further  advances  into  the
Asian mainland. We will discuss the —important and dramatic— consequences of this arrangement
in later chapters. 
At  the same  time,  Megata addressed  the  need  for  Korea's  development.  Convinced  that
Korea's central bank could not fulfill  a monopoly role as long-term creditor (and indeed, long-term
credit could well pose a risk to its business as a central bank, due to the immobilization of resources
consequential  to long-term lending),  plans  for  the reform of the colony's  financial  system also
projected the establishment  of  Agricultural and Industrial Banks. They would be provided credit
through another Japanese institution: the  Japan Industrial Bank. The latter was given the right to
issue premium bonds (ÁÂÃÄÅ wariz°-tsuke saiken), which could then be put to profitable use
by investing  in  the development  of (originally  predominantly)  the colony's  agricultural sector.152
The  Japan Industrial Bank set up a branch office in  Seoul in May 1906; it  would play a role of
formidable importance of molding the Korean economy to the Japanese policy objective of autarky,
both for  the empire  as  a  whole  and  the colonies  as  bases  for  further  power  projection.  These
agricultural and industrial banks, in 1918 united into the Korean Development Bank (ÆÇÈÉÊË
or  
È
Ê ), were of formidable  importance for  the country's  financial  development.  Their  credit
supply grew rapidly throughout the prewar period. Under the Agricultural and Industrial Banks, the
financial cooperatives continued to function as providers for credit to the peasant population, and
they too witnessed a remarkable growth in  the amount  of outstanding  credit.  Last, the  Oriental
Development Company (T°y° takushoku gink° ÌÍÎÈÊË) mainly served as promotor of land
settlements of Japanese immigrants to Korea. Put into the cold terms of quantitative abstraction, the
rearrangement of Korea's financial institutions can only be judged in beneficial terms. Not only did
they contribute greatly to the expansion of the money supply and income growth, the mobilization
of credit  also  made  it  possible  to  drive  down the formerly  excessive  rates of interest,  create a
growth-oriented economic model and establish foreigh trade relationships (mainly with Japan).153
152 Takashima, ch°sen ni okeru shokuminchi kinyÀshi no kenkyÀ, p.142.
153 See, for a quantitative overview:  Kimura, Mitsuhiko, 'Financial Aspects of Korea's Economic
Growth under Japanese Rule', Modern Asian Studies 20, no. 4 (1986): 793-820. A broader analysis
of the financial aspects of the period can be found in: Mizuta Naomasa ÏÐ
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s°tokufu jidai no zaisei: ch°sen kindai zaisei no kakuritsu (national
finance under the rule of the government-general: the consolidartion of modern Korean finance)
(Tokyo, 1974).
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XV.
With the Megata reforms in the back of our minds, one question seems unavoidable: what
do  we  make  of  all  this?  How  do  we  relate  this  early  phase  of  monetary  and  financial
interventionism with the period after 1910, marking the formal annexation of Korea? Put in broader
terms, how are we to interpret the financial aspects of Japan's colonial experience on the Korean
peninsula? And what  does this imply for a discussion of Japanese  imperialism? 154 According  to
earlier assumptions, Japanese industrialists and big business widely profited from Japanese presence
on the Korean peninsula. Fortunately, quite some scholars have already addressed this problem, and
corrected the often held view that Japan's colonial drive has it  roots in economic expansion.155 As
their arguments have been quite intricate and detailed, we must not reiterate their reasoning. It is,
however,  instructive,  to  bring  our  above  discussion  in  the  perspective  of  the  —surprising!—
findings of existing literature.
Especially from Kimura Mitsuhiko's excellent quantitative analyses, we know that economic
gain was  not the main  impetus behind Japanese encroachment  in  Korea.156 If anything, Japanese
imperialism in Korea  cannot be explained  by economic factors. Figures speak for themselves.157
Japanese  exports to Korea accounted for  only between 1% to 3% of Japanese  industrial  output
154 The reader may remark that we do not discuss the impact of the Megata reform on the Korean
populace or on Korean society. This is deliberate: not only does it fall beyond the scope of the
argument, this question has been taken up in several excellent analyses. See: Carter Eckert,
Offspring of Empire: The Koch'ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism (Seattle,
1991); Hori Kazuo, 'East Asia Between the Two World Wars —Industrialization of Japan and Its
Ex-Colonies'. Kyoto University Economic Review 137(1994), pp. 1-22; Atul Kohli, 'Where Do
High Growth Political Economies Come From? The Japanese Lineage of Korea's 'Development
State''. World Development 22:9 (1994), pp. 1269-93; Dennis McNamara, The Colonial Origins of
Korean Enterprise, 1910-1945 (Cambridge,1990). On price evolution, see: Myung Soo Cha, Cha,
Myung Soo, 'Imperial Policy or World Price Shocks? Explaining Interwar Korean Consumption
Trend'. The Journal of Economic History 58:3 (Sep 1998), pp. 731-754.
155 Peter Duus, 'Economic Dimensions of Meiji Imperialism: The Case of Korea', pp. 128-171 in
Ramon Myers & Mark Peattie (eds.), Japanese Colonial Empire (Princeton, 1984); William Gerald
Beasley, Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945, esp. pp. 1-13. The topic is also sensitively explored by
Metzler, Lever of Empire, p. 35ff.
156 Kimura, Mitsuhiko, 'Financial Aspects of Korea's Economic Growth under Japanese Rule',
Modern Asian Studies 20, no. 4 (1986): 793-820; idem, 'Standards of Living in Colonial Korea: Did
the Masses Become Worse Off or Better Off Under Japanese Rule?', The Journal of Economic
History 53, no. 3 (Sept. 1993), pp. 629-652; idem, 'The Economics of Japanese Imperialism in
Korea, 1910-1939', The Economic History Review 48, no. 3 (Aug. 1995), pp. 555-574.
157 See Kimura, idem, 'The Economics of Japanese Imperialism in Korea' (various references); he
bases his analyses on reports prepared at the time, e.g.: Government-General of Korea, Æ
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ch°sen s°tokufu t°kei nenp° (statistical yearbook of the government-general) (several
issues).
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during the whole colonial period. Exports of cotton textiles, Japan's main export commodity, were
mainly for the markets in British-India, China, and Southeast Asia. Japanese military spending for
the defense of Korea amounted to a mere 0.5% per annum of the total of products manufactured in
Japan for the larger part of the colonial period; on the contrary, Japanese share in Korea's exports
was  substantial  (eventually  leading  to  so-called  'starvation  exports'),158 but  did  not  translate  in
profits  for  industrialists...  Neither  was investment  a  defining  factor.  Corporate profits  in  Korea
occupied only 3% of all non-agricultural property income generated in Japan. The zaibatsu, as said,
did  not show great interest  in  investment  in  Korea before the late  1930s,  when the government
sponsored large-scale arms build-up programs...
Yet,  for  all  their  truth,  Kimura's  analyses  are  not  sufficiently  conclusive.  For  if  the
motivation behind imperialism was not primarily economic or financial,  what was it? I believe the
answer is to be found in what we before identified as a national security interest in the peninsula.
Economic  and/or financial  interests definitely  existed,  but they followed political objectives,  and
most certainly had to accommodate with political,  mostly military rule. Japanese governance over
Korea was thoroughly militarized, a constituency that did not have an equivalent  in  Tokyo  —at
home, military demands would at least have to take into account the interests of big business. This
is also not the same as denying the importance of monetary and fiscal policies, but rightly putting
them against the background of Japan’s national security interests.
This renews the question for the role of currency reform and the attempts to establish a yen
bloc. Put somewhat enigmatically,  but nonetheless accurate, the rationale for the yen bloc was the
yen bloc itself. Let us not forget, indeed, that this was not a currency bloc in the conventional sense
of the word. Unlike, for instance, the Latin Monetary Union, which referred to an agreement among
more or less independent nations to keep keep exchange rates coupled, members of the yen bloc did
not have the power to remain outside if they would have desired so. In this case, 'Japan and the yen
ha[d] an overpowering dominance, and arrangements [were] made with an eye to the needs of Japan
and the yen, rather than in consideration of the other areas and their currencies'.159 More than in any
other  case  of  a  currency  bloc,  concern  was  with  macroeconomic  influence (rather  than  mere
elimination of transaction costs, profits from seigniorage, or political identity).160 This is  the sole
158 See, in this respect: Kimura, 'Standards of Living in Colonial Korea'.
159 Warren S. Hunsberger, 'The Yen Bloc in Japan's Expansion Program', Far Eastern Survey VII:
22 (November 9 1938), pp. 251.
160 For an analysis of reasons behind the establishment of colonial currency blocs, see: Eric
Helleiner, 'The Monetary Dimensions of Colonialism: Why Did Imperial Powers Create Currency
Blocs?' Geopolitics 7:1 (Summer 2002), pp. 5-30. Few Western studies have addressed the question
of which administrative and managerial practices were used to achieve the objectives of
macroeconomic influence. An important exception: Dennis McNamara, 'The Keisho and the Korean
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explanation for attempts by Japanese authorities in Korea to attempt to steer the economy into the
direction of a subsidiary of the mainland economy. From reports produced under the supervision of
the Government General, we know that, initially,  the main concern had been with the development
of  the  agricultural  sector.161 Indeed,  the  aforementioned  Oriental  Development  Company  was
established with the explicit aim of increasing the production and export of foodstuffs. In the 1930s,
this changed. Formerly Japan's barn, Korea now became an entrepot. With Manchuria now being
Japan's next line  of defense,  enormous funds from the Japanese money markets were diverted to
Korea for the establishment of machine building factories, munition plants and heavy industries. In
both phases, however, policy makers were driven by a concern of economic self-sufficiency. Under
Ugaki Kazushige  áâãä ,  a  staunch supporter of economic  autarky and Korea's  Governor-
General between 1931 and 1936, Korean development  was typically  concentrated around import
substitution industries.  Very much like  the German case,  Japanese interest  in  Korea was thus a
matter of  Lebensraum  (Japanese leadership since  the Meiji-period frequently perceived Japan as
overpopulated).162 Finance immediately followed or went hand in  hand with military conquest in
order to fulfill that goal.
Business Elite'. The Journal of Asian Studies 48, no. 2 (May 1989): pp. 310-323.
161 H.I.J.M. (His Imperial Japanese Majesty's) Residency General, Annual Report for 1907 on
Reforms and Progress in Korea (Seoul, 1908); idem, The Second Annual Report on Reforms and
Progress in Korea (1908-1909) (Seoul, 1909), etc. Academic discussions include: Chul Wong
Kang, 'An Analysis of Japanese Policy and Economic Change in Korea', in Andrew Nahm (ed.),
Korea Under Japanese Colonial Rule (Kalamazoo 1974) (conference proceedings), pp.
 ????????????.
162 For an evaluation of implications of this ideology for German expansionism, see, brilliantly:
Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction —The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (New
York, 2007). Germany too turned to the strategy of import substitution, through large subsidies to
companies like IG Farben, .... ????????????????
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